



CHIANG AND FRANCO: PORK-BARREL ALLIES

THE NEW U. S. INFANTRY 20

The

Reporter

WHAT INDIA IS THINKING

August 29, 1950


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Korean Sketches *by San Bon Matsu*

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REPORTER'S NOTES

What About the Formosans?

We don't hear much about the inhabitants of Formosa—yet there are seven million of them. The President's declaration on June 27 put them in a sort of limbo, under the pro tem custody of the Chinese Nationalist Army, with the U.S. Seventh Fleet as a floating safety belt. It was an emergency measure designed to prevent the spreading of the Korean conflict. It was also a risky measure, considering that people of all sorts, from Politburo leaders to American publishers, are rooting gleefully for the extension of the conflict.

The time has come now when our government ought to decide what to do next about Formosa, and perhaps the best way to start is to take a look at the Formosans themselves. They certainly have ideas of their own about the way their island should be ruled. Their fellow Chinese had ideas of their own too, but the expression of their opinions was prevented by clash of arms. Why shouldn't our government now propose to the U. N. that the Formosans, taking full advantage of their insularity, determine their destiny by themselves, with their own ballots?

It is the vital and urgent interest of our government that the settlement of the Formosan affair become the concern of the United Nations—and particularly of the Asian nations, which are increasingly worried about our stand there. We want peace for the Formosans, who have harmed nobody and deserve no harm. To spare them the horrors of civil war, the U.N. should send an adequate mission, led by a nation like India, to ensure the Formo-

sans a chance to debate about their own destiny and then—free of any coercion—to reach their own decision.

Both Chiang and Mao may object to this procedure. But both of them are always professing their devotion to democracy, and, until the contrary is proved, a vote taken under the protection of strong impartial authorities is still the most effective tool of democratic self-expression.

As far as our country is concerned, the logical step after having imposed a moratorium on the Formosa conflict is to take the initiative for a similar moratorium on Chiang's régime in Formosa, put the island under temporary U.N. jurisdiction, and leave the Formosans free to choose what sort of government they want—Communist, Nationalist, or democratic. This pattern could later be applied to other trouble spots in Asia—including Indo-China. It's risky, for the Communists may win the electoral contests, and certainly they would not play it fair. But we—our type of democracy—can take that risk with supreme confidence, particularly if the free nations of Asia are with us. There is nothing more urgent for our government to do than to dispel the misapprehension created among all our friends, particularly in Asia, by our commitment in Formosa.

War Lords

The lovers of Nationalist China seem to have gone completely haywire. They now proclaim that MacArthur has reversed the Truman-Acheson policy on China—that by going to Taipei on the anniversary of the publication of the White Paper, he has taken over the direction of American policy in Asia. Briefly, they are trying to make MacArthur—a five-star U. S. general, the U. N. commander in Korea—the first Chinese-type war lord in the history of the United States.

Midsummer

The man felt drowsy, oppressed by the still air of the August night and by the news. As the newspaper slipped out of his hands, a relentless buzz started in his ears. Soon it became a voice. It said:

"Prove that you are not a warmonger. What was your man Lattimore doing in Pakistan? He was preparing the imperialist aggression on North Korea. And I can tell you why John Foster Dulles went to Seoul: He opened the gates to the invaders. I have here in my hand a document proving that 205—I repeat, 57—I say it again. 81 card-carrying Communists are working in the Kremlin. These lackeys of Wall Street with fiendish cold blood have planned and perpetrated aggression on the income-tax returns of the State of Wisconsin. Now prove you are not a warmonger. Have you signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal? Yes or no? Then you admit it yourself—you have stolen the secrets of the atomic bomb and given them to MacArthur while conspiring with Dulles and Lattimore. . . ."

The dozing man's mind was going round and round trying to escape the voice and to find out who the speaker could be. Then, like a flash, the answer came:

It's MALIKARTHY.

And he woke up.

On Finding Allies

Some "realists" like to say that we should take our allies wherever we can find them, wherever there are men under strong discipline who are ready to kill, no matter whether they are under Franco or under Tito or under any other dictator. As Governor Dewey put it recently:

"When you're fighting for your life—and that is what we are doing—you take the help of anyone who will give it to you. You don't ask if he's got a little corruption under his table, as long as he can fire a gun and keep American boys from being killed."

It is a pity that the realists don't reach a further conclusion: If all we need is killers, why don't we restrict the mobilization for this limited war to the nation's underworld?

Correspondence

Two Iron Curtains

To the Editor: I wish to express my appreciation for the fine series of articles in your August 1 issue on the "Strategy of Limited War." They contribute a relatively unpublishable, but I think highly important, perspective on the significance of our position vis-à-vis the Communist line.

At the risk of oversimplification, this perspective might be compared to the disparate views which we and the Communists take of the so-called Iron Curtain. We think of the Iron Curtain merely as a vertical line dividing the most obvious spheres of political influence, whereas the only Iron Curtain which the Communists recognize is a horizontal line extending between economic classes everywhere, without regard for national boundaries.

So long as there is a genuine Iron Curtain of any type in the world, there will always be a threat to world peace. To counter successfully the encroachment of the vertical curtain is a moral obligation we can and must righteously assume. But we must also recognize the horizontal distinction upon which Stalin's dialectics are based, and take the appropriate economic and political steps to disperse it.

It may be difficult for the average well-fed American to realize the importance of such a distinction in countries less fortunate than our own. But if we steadfastly ignore the underlying reason for Communist success in other nations, we may well find that our sacrifices on the military front have gone for naught.

T. L. FENNER
New York City

The Main Brake

To the Editor: I was interested in the article on the Belgian Congo by Charles Edwards.

I doubt if any American since Stanley has visited as much of the Belgian Congo as I have. As a U.S. Military Observer with the Free French and the Congo Belgians in the early years of the war, I went pretty well all over the French and Belgian territories.

Mr. Edwards failed to mention the vast quantities of palm oil which come out of the Belgian Congo and end up in Palmolive soap and kindred products.

The modern industrial city of Elizabethville, in the Katanga district, produces great quantities of copper, which is shipped to Atlantic ports over the Portuguese railway through the Portuguese colony of Angola. Many of the engineers in the Katanga mines are Americans. In effect, the mining development there might be called an American development.

It may be that political or sociological considerations have caused the Belgians to put

"Brakes on the Congo," but, to my mind and from my own observation, the principal brake on Congo development is the very inadequate and very slow transportation system, requiring transshipment from boat to rail, from rail to truck, from truck back to boat, and so on.

HARRY F. CUNNINGHAM
(Colonel, USA, Ret.)
Lincoln, Nebraska

The Unworried Luce

To the Editor: After reading "Our Best Ally" in "The Reporter's Notes," I felt highly encouraged. Only ten days ago I had written to *Life* answering the Luce magazine's editorial "Acheson or Johnson," which was, in my opinion, written in the best traditions of McCarthyism.

Whether Mr. Luce likes it or not, the actual Chinese government is a government "de facto," and I for one—after fighting in the Allied forces for four years—understand the hesitations of Dean Acheson. Our government has made enough mistakes in Southeast Asia by consistently backing the leaders most unpopular among their own people. I think that we should try to maintain peace at any cost, since we realize that we will not be able, after all, "to lick the hell out of Joe" in an hour or so.

Let us try to avoid committing the final and decisive step which would plunge the world into a third and final war—final be-

cause it would end all wars by ending life itself. This does not worry Mr. Luce, I presume, provided his good friend Chiang be satisfied.

J. M. GULDNER
St. Louis, Missouri

Report Requested

To the Editor: Since we receive our issues a month late, perhaps with the Korean situation you have already decided to report on Japan. If not, how about it? We run into a lot of people in Hong Kong, coming and going—a few reporters from French papers, but mostly businessmen or Army. No one has much good to say about the administration. Still, American publications continue to sing its praises.

Considering the errors America has had to acknowledge in its Far Eastern policy, isn't it time an unbiased report was made? Even if it doesn't stink, it can't be as good as it sounds. And it's a pretty important spot. MacArthur is accused of never seeing the Japanese people. Since the Japanese are "hypocritical"—i.e., their notion of politeness is to say what they think you want to hear—perhaps he is not in error; but someone should find out. *The Reporter* has done such a fine job on Franco, Haiti, et al., couldn't you try Japan—and the Philippines?

D. T. PICOT
Hong Kong

Contributors

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The Editors

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

August 29, 1950

Volume 3, No. 5

		Page
Rules of Thumb for Foreign Aid—an Editorial	<i>Max Ascoli</i>	4
The danger of pork-barrel allies		
Key Spots in the Crisis		
The New U. S. Infantry	<i>Colonel S. L. A. Marshall</i>	6
The Beginning of Truman's 100 Days	<i>Helen Hill Miller</i>	9
U. S. Manpower—a Major Shortage	<i>Hans H. Landsberg</i>	12
How They Put Over the Franco Loan	<i>William V. Shannon and Douglass Cater</i>	14
Franco's Spanish Enemies and His U. S. Friends	<i>Charles Wertenbaker</i>	17
How Strong Is the Red Air Force?	<i>Albert Douglas</i>	20

At Home & Abroad

I Was a Prisoner of the MVD	<i>Waldemar Hoeffding</i>	23
The bearlike clumsiness of Russia's secret police		
Does Stalin Really Want Red China in the U.N.?	<i>Peter J. Allen</i>	26
Why the Kremlin may just as soon keep Mao in his own back yard		
The Plight of Tito	<i>Gaston Coblenz</i>	27
His army is good, but his country's economy chaotic		
Needed: a Single Army of 40 Divisions	<i>Colonel X</i>	30
Western Europe's alarmingly weak defenses		
Harnessing the Missouri	<i>Robert Lasch</i>	32
With or without an MVA, the valley is in for improvements		

Views & Reviews

What India Is Thinking	<i>Margaret Parton</i>	35
Milwaukee: A Good Paper Pays Off	<i>Llewellyn White</i>	37

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Rules of Thumb for Foreign Aid

These are really dog days for our members of Congress. They have to sweat it out on Capitol Hill, with no hope of early adjournment, of vacation or fence-mending back home, just when most of them are standing for re-election. They have to exert their statesmanship around the clock—rush from the floor to committee hearings and back, digest reports, make decisions on prices and wages and foreign aid and military expenditures. These harassed public servants must often ask themselves why on earth they have followed the calling of politics or what hard luck made them successful at the art of getting votes.

The two supreme legislative bodies of the greatest democracy on earth are trying frantically to exert a measure of control over staggering events. No one on Capitol Hill—or, for that matter, no expert whose wisdom has been preserved by longevity—knows how long the present emergency will last, or whether, rather than an emergency, it is the beginning of a new way of national and international living. Yet if the American government does not find adequate ways and means of coping with the Communist threat, no democratic government in the world can. This does not make the situation of the American Congressman any easier. He can claim proudly that the future of parliaments is being decided on Capitol Hill, not in Westminster, for Congress has become the custodian if not the mother of parliaments. But all the time he knows that he is gambling both with the destiny of the nation and with his own political career.

When members of Congress debate about appropriations for public works or for special groups inside this country, they are guided by a double yardstick—their own particular partisan conception of the national welfare, and the number of votes they are likely to gain or lose. There is nothing wrong with this. The votes that elect a politician

are the chips with which he plays in his own and in the nation's interest during his term of office. An elected politician who does not care about votes is like a businessman whose actions are guided by the loss motive.

But when it comes to debates about appropriations for foreign countries, the member of Congress is largely in the dark. His decisions affect people whose ways of life and thinking he scarcely knows; yet these people—who do not vote for or against him in any November election—can defeat the purposes of the American policymakers. The Congressman's conception of our national interest in relation to a particular measure of foreign relief is likely to be foggy, colored by prejudice, exposed to the influence of special interests lobbying for foreign nations or foreign rulers.

Our government cannot help getting involved in the internal affairs of foreign nations. For the more dollars, machinery, or arms we give or lend to a country, the more we affect its internal structure—satisfying some groups and disappointing others. The more we give, the more responsible we become to the people to whom we give. Congress, the branch of our government that holds the power of the purse, owes the people on our side an account of what our wealth is doing for them—a strange and paradoxical reversal of the old principle: "no taxation without representation."

A few McCarrans and, fortunately, only one McCarthy must not make us lose sight of the fact that by and large the members of Congress are hard-working, able, patriotic men and women. This is not the time to proclaim our belief in democracy at large and then to disparage the only representative bodies in the world that have enough power to meet the Communist threat. Rather, this is the time when Congress must develop basic criteria for dealing with foreign problems—criteria that may

also guide the American electorate in judging the performances of their representatives.

Perhaps our members of Congress can find, in their own bailiwicks, rules of thumb that will help them reach decisions affecting foreign peoples. The American electorate is composed of men and women of the most diverse national, racial, and religious backgrounds, but the Congressman knows that the spokesmen for the so-called minority groups claim a power of delivering votes that is seldom borne out on election day. He knows that all special interests must be listened to—but he is a poor politician if he does not keep a close watch on the people as a whole and act as their representative.

It frequently happens that leaders of foreign governments are very much like the spokesmen for minority groups in our own country; the Congressman must learn to listen to the foreign leaders but to keep his mind on the people whose representation they claim. For we are not building, against the Russian empire, an empire of our own. We cannot farm out to just any anti-Communist clique or group the function of keeping a people on our side. Ultimately, the people themselves pass judgment on us—sometimes, if they have no other recourse, by going to the opposite camp.

The postwar elections in the former enemy countries—Germany, Italy, and Japan—had one basic issue: for or against the United States. It was as if we were running for office. Inexperience—or worse—sometimes made us back candidates who had little to offer their people except American assistance to prevent the victory of Communism.

Recently a large mission was sent to the Philippines to find out why, in spite of all our economic assistance, conditions over there are still so shaky. Slowly our government is coming to realize that pouring billions of dollars into foreign countries is waste—or a way to finance the enemy—unless we maintain the closest possible scrutiny on how the money is spent. The time is past when Congress could pass large appropriations for assistance and relief, and hand it over to local governments, shyly watched by unsophisticated American missions. Dollars going to foreign countries have a tendency, as if they were following a law of gravitation, to make the rich people richer and to leave the poor—at best—just as poor. We cannot now afford to give anything for nothing, or for just a declaration of anti-Communism. We must see to it that our help

does what it is intended to do—improve the standard of living of the people and strengthen their devotion to democratic institutions. Our foreign policy is being subjected to an immediate test; its success or failure depends on the willingness of foreign people not only to vote for us but to stand by us and, if need be, share the fighting with us.

The recent decision of the Senate to give \$100 million to Franco, on a pork-barrel basis, simply means that we don't care about the Spanish people. We don't mind the shackles that the Franco régime has clamped on them. And yet the existence of these shackles, the fact that Franco cannot risk even the most-rigged, old-style Tammany election, should have warned our Senators: He would not dare run for dogcatcher in his country. By underwriting his régime, we have exposed ourselves to the wrath of the Spanish people.

There are three simple rules of thumb for our Congressmen to keep in mind when considering legislation on foreign countries:

1. Remember the people, for ultimately they will pass judgment on us and decide whether to stand with us or with our enemies.
2. Never give unconditional assistance to any government.
3. Never back a leader who, by oppressing his own people, denounces himself as unfit to rule.

Our Congressmen should remember that we lost China because we gave Chiang too many unconditional gifts of goods and arms—gifts that Mao is now enjoying. We could have saved Chiang if we had forced him to serve the interests of his people and not of his clique. How many more nations do we want to push to the Communist side?

Most of the Senators who voted for the "loan" to Spain were probably too harassed and misinformed to know what they were doing. How else explain the fact that Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Irving Ives of New York, and George Aiken of Vermont, to mention only a few, voted unconditional aid to Franco? There may still be time to repair the wrong that has been done to the Spanish people and to our own national interest—if only our legislators remember that people all over the world demand as much respect and care as the people whose votes put them in office.

—MAX ASCOLI

The New U. S. Infantry

And the Rediscovery of Land Warfare

A few mornings after our rude awakening in Korea, everyone was asking, "How did it happen?" The question carried the unmistakable implication that once again American lives had been wasted because once again military men had made all the wrong guesses in terms of men and weapons.

In the weeks since June 25, many partial answers to this question have been made by sideline critics who know a good deal about the weapons deficiencies and general lack of field strength which made us vulnerable in a relatively minor peninsular campaign. Their refrain is that one more terrible embarrassment has come our way because the military operate with closed minds, and cannot even judge properly the interrelated effects of fighting tools. But these critics haven't looked into the history of the case.

To say wherein we were found lacking is no longer a job for a military expert. Before the Korean war was two weeks old, the layman could see that those who control the purse strings—namely, Congress and the Executive branch of the government—had grievously underestimated the influence and role of land fighting.



This neglect has continued through the five Truman years. The Army has asked, but it has not received. Not one Congressman has championed its cause or said aloud that when the Army is unfit to fight, our military structure is a house without a founda-



tion, no matter how well armed and ready the other services are. The entire Army we had when the North Koreans attacked would not have been strong enough to halt them; the Army now being planned or projected is no more than enough to sustain us through this one campaign.

It has also been clearly revealed that our standing force was weak not only in size but in training and weaponing. In the Second World War we learned that infantry has little effect against tanks, and that in general it will stand only when its own armor meets the enemy's on fairly even terms, but we ignored the lesson. We have not trained infantry and armored formations together, so that foot troops would be accustomed to having a shield and a highly mobile artillery wherever they were compelled to fight. Our armor is mainly organized into separate battalions, the function of which is unrelated to any valid theory of war. Those who were most familiar with the working of the combat line in the Second World War knew armor must have the same position in relation to infantry that it held in 1945. They insisted upon this when certain civilian experts argued that the new 3.5-inch rocket launcher, or some other variation of the shaped-charge bazooka

principle, would enable infantry to cope with armor, and relegate tanks to the limbo of useless weapons.

Despite glowing reports from Korea about the 3.5-inch bazooka, experienced line officers who have tested it in this country have little enthusiasm for it, and see no chance that it will revolutionize anti-tank fighting. Under conditions which appear to give them a chance for success and survival, such as town fighting, or working from the flanks of a defile, average infantrymen will attack tanks with rifle grenades, Molotov cocktails, or peashooters. But they will not fight tanks in the open where they feel naked against counter fire—especially if they must stand in a hail of automatic-weapon and small-arms fire to launch a rocket whose blast-flash effect is bound to expose them at the first round.

We have never closed the gap between what an infantryman really thinks and what the Ordnance Department decides arbitrarily that he ought to be able to do. Ordnance is an empire of its own, callous toward suggestions from the line, not subject to close control by the General Staff, and bolstered by the backstairs influence of civilian contractors. This "protective association" does some valuable work—for instance, promoting interest in the cause of national defense among industrialists; but that is offset by the harm done by the



way it sustains Ordnance in an ultra-independent position. So in denying that the Army as a whole has been blind, arrogant, or overorthodox, one would have to add that there is an exception—Army Ordnance.


The new weapons so badly needed when the Korean war began existed only in design, or at the end of assembly lines in the arsenals, partly as a consequence of dollar-pinching and partly because of the vagueness of a foreign policy which for over four years made it impossible for the military to figure out what it would be up against in the future.

If the weapons situation was permitted to stagnate throughout this time, certainly it was not because of any fundamental unsoundness in prevailing doctrine. The key to what the Army as a whole thinks will be found in the theory advanced by its schools and boards. At the Command and General Staff College, at the Infantry School, and conspicuously at the Armored School throughout the postwar years, the line has been that in future war the United States would require a more mobile and heavier-weaponed infantry, and a better tank as the basis for an expanded armored force.

The boards whose task it was to outline a suitable weapons and operational pattern did not deviate in any vital particular from this concept. Following the Patch Board in 1945-1946, the Haislip Board in 1947-1948 wrote a report on future needs that stands up excellently even in the light of present events. The McLain Weapons Evaluation Panel of 1949, supplementing the work of these earlier boards, recommended that the loads carried by infantrymen be radically reduced, and struck hard against every weapon which seemed not to have justified itself as an effective killing instrument.

The new and stronger infantry division, expanded from a pre-Second World War fourteen thousand men to nearly eighteen thousand, with an added battalion of tanks and of anti-aircraft artillery, and a build-up of field artillery strength to include twenty-four additional 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, gives form to certain of these ideas.

We have had it for three years—on paper. Had it been ready for the field in Japan, the Korean venture would



have gone well from the start. Save that it is too rigid to give us much flexibility against guerrilla tactics, and therefore needs to be supplemented by self-contained units of a radically different character, the new infantry division provides the practical answer to most of the problems in land fighting that we are likely to run into now or later.

If Army theory was moving thus soundly and swiftly, why was Army practice so far behind?

From the end of the Second World War until about the end of 1946, the United States thought the atomic bomb would ultimately compel nations to resolve their differences peacefully. The military doubted this, but did not press their doubts too hard. It was not the time to beat the drum for a modernized Army, trained to readiness and equipped with the most perfect arms that could be devised in the light of Second World War experience.

The illusion that we could win peace by having loosed a deadlier form of power than the world had known faded when the Russians blocked the Baruch plan for atomic control within the United Nations. But we still thought that we had a time margin of five years beyond 1947 before the Russians could be expected to produce an atomic explosion. No additional attention was directed toward the static condition of the Army. The cry rose stronger than ever that our efforts should be centered on the atomic-weapons build-up. Field-weapons problems could be solved some time later. Those who controlled military policy by controlling

appropriations felt this way, so the Army had to go along.

To look more closely at the course of American foreign policy during this time:

It was committed mainly to the quest for a stable peace, working through the mechanism of United Nations. This utopian aim of itself tended to exclude any but the most gradual orientation toward a system of collective security outside the U.N. It meant that State Department planners dared not look in any other direction, and that military planners could not base their calculations, in matters large or small, on the imponderable that a next war—if any—would find the United States in effective alliance with some of its old friends in Europe. The Truman Doctrine was enunciated in the spring of 1947, and we began to supply military aid to Greece and Turkey. But we made no gesture toward strengthening military ties with free Europe as a whole. The Marshall Plan took shape in the eight months which followed: We got ready to help restore the European economy, but a compact in arms to protect our investment was not even mentioned.

During these in-between years our strategy was between the devil and the deep. The main threat was, of course, Russia. The facts argued that if war came, we might have to go it pretty much alone. Russian effectiveness in land fighting power had been conclusively demonstrated during the Second World War. It was inconceivable that the limited forces left to the United States could successfully come to grips

with this power on a continental mass in the early stages of war.

From these wholly valid assumptions arose the theory (and plan) of war at long range, waged from distant bases protected by water spaces—such areas as the North African coast. Strategic air would be the main body of attack in the opening stage, its target the heart of the enemy country. The role of land power would be to screen the air bases, to seize and defend more advanced ground for bases when the opening afforded, and to gather up the pieces, after the air attack had fragmented and demoralized the enemy.

It was a chilling concept in that it reduced land power, the traditional symbol of national wartime morale, to the status of a street sweeper in the wake of the Air Force parade.

Inevitably this reacted upon the weapons program. It gave armor, anti-tank weapons, and field divisions low priority. The tools of long-range bombardment—the heavy bomber and the atomic bomb—were counted on to score the telling blows.

The Air Force has taken a bad beating in recent weeks for having lagged in postwar development of its tactical strength. But if the case were studied in perspective, the Air Force assessment of priorities would not be counted far wrong. It had to follow the line of main chance; it must continue so to do.

These, then, were the blocks to a rounded and balanced program of national preparation until two years ago. President Truman's 1948 St. Patrick's Day speech committing us to join our military strength with that of the other free nations startled the Pentagon even more than the State Department.

The Army saw then, well in advance of all others, that a fatal cleavage was developing between the lines we were taking in foreign affairs and in strategy. It moved on its own initiative to close the gap. In April, 1948, a paper, outlining what has since materialized as the North Atlantic Pact and the Military Assistance Program, and proposing this as the base for a new American strategy, was prepared in the Chief of Staff's office and was approved by Generals Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton Collins. The late Secretary Forrestal read it and began to champion its aims, though the truth is that it was written in direct opposi-



tion to ideas which he had previously expressed on Capitol Hill. The following month in Congress Senator Vandenberg introduced a resolution that was the opening political move toward military union with free Europe.

But what the Army had proposed was accepted only in part. The lawmakers clutched at the shadow and missed the substance. Professional soldiers well realized that the military power, prestige, and peace-keeping possibility of the alliance would be augmented more by what we did to gird ourselves than by the matériel given western Europe. They did not think we could transfuse vigor to our anemic partners if we remained indifferent to the state of our own blood cells. At the heart of the initial proposal lay the proposition that Europe would not develop the requisite degree of zeal for the program unless America were armed and ready to move when—and if—the hour struck.

Accordingly, a modest build-up in American field and air strength was proposed as the natural complement of the European program. It was rejected, mainly for reasons of economy. Our effective strength was actually reduced below the level where it stood before the President's speech. Events may prove that to be the most fateful error in our history. If you get there two minutes after the bus has left, you miss it.

We wasted two years of irretrievable opportunity. In the mad rush to repair the damage done to our own position by this lapse, there is more risk now that we will overlook the most vital points. The Army and government branches are toiling over the complex question: "How much fighting power shall we mobilize to deal with Korea and brace ourselves for whatever may lie beyond Korea?"

Less carefully considered is the equally grave question: What kind of power will it be? How will it be equipped, trained, and balanced?

We are accustomed to thinking of battle in terms of firm lines, supported by rigid and conventional supply systems. Save for bushwhacking expeditions in the tropics, we have had little experience in this century with anything else. In the two World Wars, the standard "Leavenworth-approved solutions" worked out very well for the most part, not because they contained a universal magic, but because the simple geography of the problem made them applicable. That is a realization which should make us humbly grateful rather than cocksure.

The face of war changes constantly. With the coming of the heavy tank and the heavy bomber, it was certain that ultimately the offensive would become more fluid—that formal columns, striking for the most part via the conventional traffic arteries, would be paralleled far afield by smaller, highly mobile, self-contained bodies of troops, probing for weak spots through which to break into the rear area. They would be more rugged than most. They would know how to live off the land. When munitions ran low, air supply would be at their disposal if simpler methods failed. This is guerrilla operation in its modern sense, waged in accordance with the possibilities of present weapons.

The irregularities in the manner of enemy attack which have baffled our troops in Korea are only a sample of the methods which we are likely to encounter on the grand scale further along. We do not have anything even remotely resembling a doctrine on guerrilla warfare—either to wage it ourselves, support others who are wag-

ing it, or frustrate those who bring it against us.

Present events demand a change in the thinking of the United States Army. In our generation we have conducted war on a very comfortable basis; despite our Pearl Harbors and Bataans, we have always had time, money, and supplies to burn. If our way of doing things was not perfect, it was good enough to meet the need.

But what was good enough is no longer even good. The main problem is not one of tactics but of philosophy. To supplement our present standard division—a first-class instrument—with light troops like the Ranger battalions and airborne regiments of the Second World War is only the down payment. New requirements are being imposed on the whole military structure. Chief among them are that *all* soldiers must be trained and mentally conditioned for combat, that all installations must be provided with all-around protection, and that in building our rear structure we aim for movement rather than massiveness. Highly mobile advanced bases, more mobile field bases, ports which measure their capacities in the speed of the turnaround in both directions, maintenance crews which are as adept with a tommy gun as with a wrench, troops which live by the rule "When in doubt, hit out!", junior leaders who command by winning the love of their men—these are what we must have.

Average Americans can be lifted to this level of performance, given the inspiration of a truly enlightened training system and the backing of a nation which has made weight for the contest. There is nothing wrong with the American as a fighter; the trouble is that the best use is not always made of his natural power.

Korea has shown this once again. The shortcomings of our campaign are the end product of our whole slipshod national attitude toward the problem of war. Its virtues are those of an outmatched, green army gaining through the ordeal of battle the essential unity which is supposed to derive from training. That the American can still meet this most terrible of all tests is a tribute to some inner ability to harden the spirit even while so much that is devitalizing plays upon it.

—COLONEL S. L. A. MARSHALL

The Beginning Of Truman's 100 Days

Seventeen years after the "Hundred Days" of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first Administration, practically all the legislation then passed, such as expanded Federal credit facilities, relief and public works and SEC, is still on the books. The AAA is not only alive but has grown in all directions. TVA is an established institution, serving as a bench-mark for surveys of other valleys. The dollar has stayed off the gold standard. Only the NRA's Blue Eagle, which died within two years, is absent.

A change so sharp and of such magnitude was wholly unprecedented. Yet a case can be made that it set a precedent, and that a comparable change, as great and quite possibly as lasting, is taking place this summer.

It is two months since the wires

diately after Pearl Harbor. Korea was a military aggression; the first Presidential recommendations on July 19 concerned the removal of limits to the size of the armed forces; immediate call-up of more men; increased military procurement; and authorization of the Mutual Defense Assistance program for arming other free nations, particularly those associated in the North Atlantic Treaty. If the U.S.S.R. should enlarge the area of military involvement in the near future, the short-run parallel with the days after Pearl Harbor would be very close indeed.

But if the trial of strength between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and the United States and the nations associated with it under the U. N. continues as a series of local engagements rather than full-scale war, the days after Pearl Harbor are not the pertinent parallel. And even if full-scale war should come soon, it is only for the short run that the post-Pearl Harbor parallel would hold.

The grim fact is that for the foreseeable future, whether or not the nation is engaged in open conflict, American resources will have to be expended for military purposes in a proportion hitherto unknown. That rate of expenditure, and the degree of government participation required to allocate resources between the military and the civilian sectors of the economy, are going to bring long-term changes in American life fully comparable to those of 1933.

From that point of view, the important part of the President's message was the latter part, beginning with his recommendation that, first, Congress authorize government priorities and allocations of materials, including limitation of the use of materials for non-essential purposes, and the requisition-



flashed news of the North Korean aggression. It is scarcely more than a month since President Truman's message of July 19. Yet the changes made in these few weeks suggest that something like the Hundred Days are here again.

At first glance, the pertinent parallel might seem to be not with the Hundred Days, but with the period imme-

ing of supplies and materials needed for national defense, especially excessive inventories; and that, second, measures be adopted to compensate for the demands that our increased military program will make on the economy. Those demands include manpower as well as commodities, and meeting them will have its effect on both producer and consumer goods.

Among the second group of measures, the President proposed taxation to draw off industrial and individual purchasing power and thereby reduce the scramble for lessened supplies, which could otherwise have only one result—rapid inflation. Such taxation would also supply the Treasury with some of the new revenue needed to finance new defense procurement, electric power and atomic-energy development, and stockpiling. Another aim of the proposed tax bill is to take the profit out of war.

Restraints on credit expansion and controls on consumer credit, credit used for commodity speculation, and privately financed real-estate credit were also proposed. And, the President added, if a sharp rise in prices should occur, he would recommend price control and rationing.

This is the outline of a new economy. In many respects, it bears strong resemblances to the economy of the years 1941-1945. But the measures adopted then were measures to get the nation over a hump; they were adopted with the understanding that they were temporary; and, when the time came, they were discarded with joyous abandon.

The present proposals are not undertaken with the idea of getting the economy over a hump. They are adopted with the idea of getting it up onto a plateau, where it will remain for some time to come. The American standard of living will have to accustom itself to a rarefied atmosphere. The pastures on the plateau may be green by comparison with what might be available at a still higher level of military expenditure; but they won't be the lush provender of the civilian valleys.

The public's mid-July rush to buy things showed little appreciation of the difference between a short war and a long warlike peace. Industrial purchasers who ventured into the deepen-

ing grays of the steel market were simply trying to put off the evil day of shortage; but the family that rolled home on four new tires to unload grocery bags of sugar and coffee, and department-store boxes of girdles and nylons, usually sighed with relief at the thought that "this will see us through." What the shopping expedition is likely to have accomplished is rather the forcing of the nation into more rigid controls sooner than might otherwise have proved necessary.

The immediate impact of the rush buying of July served, moreover, to underline the major economic difference between today and either the Roosevelt Hundred Days or the period after Pearl Harbor. As of mid-1950, the economy of the United States, vastly enlarged though it had been in the decade of the 1940's, was running close to capacity. Before Korea became a household word, a sizable boom largely of civilian origin was already under way. Nearly sixty-one and a half million people were at work. Wages paid the average industrial worker in June reached a new record of \$1.45 an hour, and weekly take-home pay, reflecting increased overtime, a new record of \$58.89. Industrial profits of 450 corporations in all fields of business for the second quarter were \$1,625,040,257, an all-time high, and forty-three per cent over last year. These figures all represent economic activity as it was before the upsurge of buying in July.

To the economic pressures for rapid and far-reaching controls have been added a series of political pressures. American opinion in this crisis, unlike American opinion either in 1933 or 1940, is not divided in its main objective. In view of the over-all unanimity, political differences are bound to concern themselves with *how* what needs

to be done shall be done, rather than *whether* the country should do it.

Such a situation produces a curious assortment of bedfellows. For some years, the Hamiltonian Republicans and the Jeffersonian Democrats have been walking about in each others' shoes; the Democrats have urged strong governmental power and the Republicans have cried for letting nature take its course, or at least for a maximum of decentralization. But, groping under the same bed, the Republicans now seem to have got back their former footwear. In the three weeks after the President's message, Congress began to force the Administration's pace, first with the idea that standby control powers should be provided immediately and not left for later, as the President's message had proposed, and then, for a while, by pressing a provision that selective price-wage controls and rationing should become automatically effective if and when the retail-price index reached five per cent above its June 15 level.

The rush for controls comes from quarters so varied as to be illuminating. It is in part in anticipation of the November election, when each side will vie with the other as the nation's best defender, with the Democrats trying to obscure memories of Louis Johnson's economies and the Republicans trying to obscure memories of their appropriations votes. It is in part a response to the voice of Bernard Baruch, playing, for the third time, the role of Cassandra. It is in part a projection of the aims of those, fewer perhaps than formerly, who fervently believe in a preventive war. It is in part a response to those of the President's advisers who believe that new agencies will be needed to administer the crisis.

The differences within the President's entourage underline the new choices that are having to be made because of the long-term nature of present economic rearrangements. The President, partly, perhaps, against the background of his experiences with the Truman Committee, started out strongly in favor of having old-line agencies do the job. Soon after its formation, the National Security Resources Board, to the surprise of its first chairman, was ruled by the President to be an advisory agency only, without operating functions. As things





Harris & Ewing

The Federal Triangle

stood at the time of his message, the NSRB was to do the planning, and the Cabinet departments, whose heads constitute the NSRB, would do the job. Commerce would handle allocations, Labor would handle manpower, Agriculture would handle farm commodities, and so on.

As the days have gone by, pressures have begun to accumulate for an agency comparable to the old War Production Board. Recently alumni of WPB and other Second World War bureaus have begun to appear in Washington in force, mostly gravitating to the NSRB—the nearest thing to an emergency agency in town.

If there turns out to be a series of crisis agencies, if there turn out to be wage, price, and profit controls, and rationing, the long-term nature of the forthcoming task raises some problems that have not been raised, or faced, before. Who are going to staff the new agencies, and how extensive will their territory be?

In WPB and the galaxy of other wartime agencies, the men who came to administer were on more or less protracted leave from their regular jobs. They laid great emphasis on their status as executives-momentarily-in-Washington rather than bureaucrats-

serving-a-life-term-in-government. For a short-run effort that was all right. For a long-run effort the fiction of being an executive-on-leave will not only wear thin, it will be so patently thin to start with that it can hardly serve as a basis for getting good men to come.

The problem of staff is the same for all the major pressure groups, farm and labor as well as business. Labor has started early in its determination to be included, this time, at the over-all planning level rather than in specialized pigeonholes. Yet the staff members whom it has nominated as assistants to W. Stuart Symington and Robert J. Smith, his second in command, are technicians rather than big shots. Even the labor big shots will operate as part of a national policy committee in an advisory capacity only.

Over the long term, how will all the sectors of the economy take to a freeze? How wide a spread of controls is going

to be necessary to keep manufacturers from escaping price controls by making fancy shirts of slightly different cut rather than the standard garments that are more needed but easier to classify? How soon is labor going to develop a new set of fringe issues on which to negotiate while accepting the requirement that on wages they and their employers hold the line? How fast will farmers find new price-upping factors which they believe should be inserted in the parity formula? How soon will consumers become monotonously proficient in appearing before their ration boards demanding tires for their car pools, sugar for their bees? Clearly, distortions of the economy arising from the inventiveness of a people with little liking for controls can be serious and costly.

Equally clearly, a static economy, continued over a long period, can provide the technical basis for defeat. A careful course must now be charted between the dangers of meaningless distortion to escape controls, and an economic straitjacket that induces industrial lag. For the economy whose outlines are emerging in the midsummer days of 1950 will be with the United States for a long time to come.

—HELEN HILL MILLER



U. S. Manpower— A Major Shortage

Few people except population experts realize it, but the United States seems to be in for a serious manpower shortage. The depression years of the early 1930's—specifically the fact that the birth rate went sharply down in that period because many people couldn't afford to raise families—lie at the root of the trouble.

The newspaper reader is, of course, exposed to releases about how his community has grown by such-and-such per cent, or how the U.S. population has jumped nineteen million in the last decade. But there is a catch: The population has grown least, and even decreased, in the age groups that are most important for war. The fact is that since 1940 the ranks of fifteen- to nineteen-year-olds have thinned by close to two million.

Along with the decrease in youths, there has been an unprecedented expansion in the numbers of the very

young and the old. Seventy per cent of our population growth since 1940 has been in the groups under fourteen and over fifty-five, which not only contribute least in terms of peacetime production or wartime fighting, but often have to be taken care of and supported by the more active groups of the population. A graph of our population averaged by age groups, which normally has the shape of a pyramid, with the youngest forming the base, now shows a decided slimness in the waist.


The size of the national labor force, being a periodic head-count of the employed, the unemployed, and the armed forces, tends to fluctuate rapidly. Its ranks may be swollen by women, by persons normally too old or too young to work, and by those who for a multitude of reasons have not wanted to work. Our labor force, including those in military service, numbered just be-

low sixty-six million early in July, topping by some 7.5 million the July, 1940, figure. Over the past ten years it has grown somewhat faster than the population group aged fourteen and over, with the result that we now have a smaller reserve of employables to draw on than we had in 1940. In addition, low birth rates in the 1930's left a relatively large group of childless young women who were ready for work in the early 1940's. Today, the tremendous crop of babies has put a definite limit on the availability of efficient female labor. This is vitally important because women make up by far the largest labor reserve in the age group from twenty-five to forty-five.

The small depression baby crop means that our labor force cannot count on the youngsters—whom the Pentagon has its eye on in any case. A further drawback is that we are already working slightly longer hours than we were in 1940. This leaves us with less margin for increasing man-hours than there was in 1940. It is true that shifts in the age distribution have made it possible to draw more heavily upon people aged fifty-five and over, but this is a minor offsetting factor. Of greater importance is the increase in individual productivity that has taken place since 1940.

Naturally, these data are crude, but they define roughly the area of possible expansion. The limits they set are not, however, hurdles to be overcome by that extra ounce of effort or "know-how," but walls that can neither be shifted, skirted, or scaled.

How can the labor reserves be pulled into the labor force? For one thing, many not now employed will be glad to take jobs as the opportunities arise. Beyond this, we shall have to rely on higher wages, appeals to patriotism, the pressure of public opinion, and, as




The Production Picture - 1940 vs 1950

Total Production (gross national product—in 1940 dollars)



Output per worker

(1940 = 100)



a very last resort, controls, to draw the employables into the labor force. Our Second World War experience suggests, however, that we can squeeze no more than seven million out of the reserve pool—and that only if we give a good deal of organized assistance to young mothers to free them for work.

So far we have treated the "labor force" as though it were as homogeneous as a bushel of wheat or a ton of coal. It is not, of course. Above all—and here we run head-on into one of the greatest differences between 1940 and 1950—the labor force includes the unemployed. In July, 1940, these numbered 9.2 million. In the first week of July, 1950, there were about six million fewer. This difference has caused some economists to rub their hands in glee, others to wring them in despair. Neither attitude seems wholly justified.

Having a smaller amount of unemployment, much of it in the higher age groups, will save us the expense of large-scale training programs. The man who today works on the body of a passenger sedan is ready tomorrow to work on the body of a recon car. We are starting off with far more skilled workers than we had in 1939-1941, partly because skilled workers haven't gone rusty through unemployment and partly because of the vast vocational-training program carried on since 1945, largely under the G.I. Bill of Rights. Only a few weeks ago educators and occupational-outlook experts were lamenting that we had too many skilled technicians and professionals, too many high-school and college graduates for the jobs available. Today this abundance is an asset, giving us the most highly skilled labor force ever.

The optimists have a final point: With a minimum expenditure of labor, our mothball fleet, our closed-down Army camps, and our inactivated war plants should be ready for use. This legacy should greatly lower our manpower needs, at least for a time.

Against these calculations, the pessimists point out that in 1940, with nine million unemployed, our armed forces and war plants could dig into the manpower heap with steam shovels. Now, the shovels must be discarded, and carefully selected spoonfuls taken if there are not to be major disruptions. Now, or at least very soon, every man put in uniform has to be taken away from a useful pursuit, and replacing him cannot be left to chance. Moreover, our present heavy employment reduces mobility, both in terms of skill and of location. The jobholder is less open to suggestion that he be retrained

or change one environment for another.


Even if we had ten million unemployed today, expansion of production would be out of the question unless existing plants increased their capacity and new construction were undertaken. For the moment, therefore, we need not bring in manpower considerations to prove that war production can only *replace* and not *be added* to civilian production. If and when capacity expands, then the absence of an unemployed reserve will force further reductions in civilian production.

For the immediately foreseeable future, then, manpower is unlikely to become our No. 1 problem, in the sense that it will retard either the build-up of the armed forces or production.

The lack of slack does, however, have at least two other consequences. In the first place, certain skills will become scarce sooner than others, in spite of the recent training programs. Tool- and diemakers, for example, were at a premium long before there was a general manpower shortage in the Second World War and are likely to be in short supply once more. In many trades, the military forces will be a strong competitor for skills. Even now, electronic technicians are badly wanted in the armed forces, and each one taken from a civilian job will leave a hard-to-fill vacancy. What will soon become true for specific skills and trades is already a fact for specific areas. Cities like South Bend, Denver, and Dallas are on the Labor Depart-

The Population Picture - 1940 vs 1950

(figures in millions)



ment's "A" list, meaning that less than three per cent of the labor force is unemployed. Others, like Providence and Scranton, are in the "E" category, with twelve per cent or more of the labor force unemployed. Recently the "E" list has grown thinner. At the beginning of the year it comprised forty-three communities. By July only twenty-two communities were still on the critical list. Since the last count preceded the Korean crisis, later figures will undoubtedly show a further drop in the "E" list, and perhaps a rise in the "A" list.

These shortages, of which we shall hear more and more, call for three kinds of remedies. First, the armed forces must be built up with utmost consideration for the manpower picture, so that the Army and our industrial machinery will be kept in balance.

Second, to the greatest extent feasible, and with due regard for security considerations, our procurement program must be made to harmonize with the geographical manpower situation to avoid a costly rush of labor from low- into high-pressure areas, with the accompanying problems of transportation, housing, and, above all, higher wages.

Third, just as we shall be faced almost immediately with the need of curtailing production for civilian use, we should get set to define those parts of our economy which contain the largest number of frills—normally the distributive and service industries. These constitute another large reservoir which will both plug manpower gaps in war production and yield a sizable quota for the actual fighting.

A start has been made in these directions by the Labor Department with its announcement of key occupations, and by the Commerce Department with its list of essential industries. Both should guide the armed forces in their call-up of reserves. The stress on qualitative controls is all to the good, and so is the fact that the job has been left to existing agencies. While initially it may suffice for these agencies to provide only guidance, they may someday be forced to make their controls mandatory. The failure to strike the proper balance in using manpower for production of weapons and the raising of forces to use them could prove fatal to us in modern war.

—HANS H. LANDSBERG

How They Put Over The Franco Loan

On August 1, the United States Senate voted to grant Spain a hundred-million-dollar loan. The Administration's wavering front against Spanish fascism had finally crumpled. Except for the long-shot possibility that this rider to the omnibus appropriation bill would be killed in Senate-House conference, victory in Washington had at last been won by the Spanish lobby.

The Senate's action came with unexpected swiftness. Two weeks previously, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, long an advocate of aid to Spain, had introduced an amendment providing that "\$100,000,000 shall be used only for assistance to Spain . . ." Administration forces, beset with other problems in pushing through the troublesome appropriations bill, were not particularly worried. They planned to kill the amendment on a point of

order, by arguing that it contained legislative content—a stratagem which defeated the same amendment in August, 1949. Jack McFall, the State Department's liaison man with Capitol Hill, was so informed, and he in turn passed these assurances to the White House.

But at the Democratic Policy Committee meeting the next morning, several Senators sounded an alarm. They had taken an informal poll and found that at least sixty Senators were prepared to vote for the amendment as it stood. The Policy Committee, stampeded by this news, switched to a stratagem of expediency. It was agreed that Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming would amend the McCarran rider to provide that the hundred million dollars would be in addition to the amount already appropriated for ECA. That way, as Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona put it, the Senate would at least not "rob Peter to pay Paul."

That afternoon on the Senate floor, McCarran and Owen Brewster of Maine plugged away at their familiar eulogies of Franco. Senator Chavez of New Mexico, another old advocate of the loan, danced nimbly back and forth between the arguments of moral obligation ("how can we moralize to the world, if we deny the kind of help that will stop Communism to the only country in Europe that has fought Communism?") and expediency ("What is another reason? Stern reality, again keeping in mind that the world needs friendship and that friendship gives strength"). A bitter revulsion against the very premises of the Administration's European policy keyed the arguments of Senator O'Connor of Maryland. ("Billion after billion of dollars have been poured into England, which had repudiated principles



Wide World

Franco's man: Lequerica

which are the essence of the economic system which has brought our country to its present high estate.")

But it was Senator Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who sounded the victory note for the Spanish-aid proponents. "I think," he said, "that we are at a point in world affairs where we have to be very realistic, where we have to be very wise, and where we have to be reasonably imaginative . . ." He argued that "the Pyrenees Mountains were designed by the Almighty as if to form a barricade . . ."

"Realism" and "military expediency" won the day. Caught off guard by the unexpectedness of the Democratic Policy Committee's reversal, the major opponents of the rider had no speeches prepared. Only Senators Lehman of New York and Morse of Oregon spoke against it. The point of order originally planned to defeat McCarran's amendment was never raised. The final vote was 65 to 15, and not all the latter were opposed to the principle of the Senate's act. Later a Democratic Senator, analyzing the vote, took his pencil and checked off three of the fifteen: Byrd of Virginia, Ecton of Montana, and Williams of Delaware. "Those boys don't care about aid to Spain," he said. "They vote against anything that means spending money."

On Wednesday morning, Secretary Acheson reiterated his opposition to including such aid in the ECA appropriation. The following day the President, privately agreeing with Elmer Davis's comment that the Senate had handed Moscow a Christmas present, told reporters he hoped the Senate would reconsider. At seven o'clock that evening Senator Kilgore of West Virginia dutifully rose to ask reconsideration. The opposition was ready. Quickly the presiding officer, Senator Hoey of North Carolina, recognized a motion to table Kilgore's request, thus cutting off debate. A weary and torpid Senate ignored the President and Secretary of State by the same crushing majority: 65-15. No important committee chairman had stayed in line for the Administration.

Behind the machinelike smoothness of the Senate action on August 1 and 3 lay many considerations. An important one was the panic of many Senators

over the world situation. Never fully convinced of the validity of the Truman-Acheson foreign policy, they now are rushing to sacrifice the larger purposes of that policy in a "realistic" scramble for military outposts. Even Senators who had seemed to understand the State Department's objectives now succumbed out of fatigue or a sense of helplessness.

Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, who has stood many times in the spotlight at Madison Square Garden to thunder lusty opposition to Franco, voted for the amendment. When buttonholed in the Senate antechamber later, he gave two reasons for his vote: First, as an advocate in the past of a loan to Russia, he felt that he had to be

consistent, even though he disliked the Spanish government equally. Second, he felt that the times were now so serious that "we can't afford to be too particular about our friends."

One prominent Democratic Senator, who had opposed aid to Franco in the past, looked up wearily from his desk. "This isn't something we're proud of. We don't feel like sending up rockets to tell the people back home. But there isn't much time left and we've fumbled the ball on two counts. We've got no answer to the Communist-inspired Stockholm 'Peace' Appeal which is gathering millions of signatures, and we've got no answer to the Russian-trained troops which are ready to sweep across the continent. I had



Keystone

Senator McCarran and Generalissimo Franco

hoped we could wait to get rid of that guy Franco but there simply isn't time."

The lapse of individual Senators was by no means as important as the vague position taken by the State Department—a position which provided no bulwark, moral or strategic, against which a Senator might brace himself. Not since 1946 has the State Department taken the offensive on the Spanish issue. Since that time, it has raised a series of equivocal objections to a loan, but has never eloquently pointed out the disrupting effects it might have on our relations with our western European allies. If the United States has a positive approach to the Spanish problem, it is too subtle for most U.S. Senators to understand. Last April, Dean Acheson conceded that economic aid to Spain would not be objectionable, but he insisted that the Export-Import Bank should handle the loan. This stand was sufficiently logical to swing a majority of votes in the Senate against a Spanish-aid rider at that time. But the Export-Import Bank, closely tied to the political directives of the State Department, has not acted on a Spanish application for seven hundred thousand dollars, pending for over four months. Since the bank has found time in the past to make loans to Argentina and Yugoslavia, certain Senators suspect the State Department of bad faith in dangling the Export-Import loan like a carrot before the Spanish mule.

In contrast to the weakness of the State Department's position, the Department of Defense has carried on a purposeful campaign of its own. Presumably the National Security Council, presided over by the President, is the place where the military should take their views to be reconciled with the political arguments of the State Department. Instead, Secretary Louis Johnson has not hesitated to lobby for his case on Capitol Hill. At a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee he announced that a loan to Spain would be a good idea. Shortly before the McCarran rider came to a vote, rumors buzzed on the Hill that this loan was to be part of a deal to procure B-36 bases in Spain. One columnist reported that the Pentagon and the State Department were indeed already engaged in such negotiations. This has been firmly denied—by the State Department.

Instrumental in the pro-Franco tri-

umph of August 1 was the Franco lobby, presided over by its paid agent, the urbane Charles Patrick Clark, who carries the ball for José Félix de Lequerica, Franco's ambassador-at-large in Washington. Convinced that time was on his side, Clark has pursued an unhurried course, deftly bringing to bear the pressures of military expedi-



Wide World

Charles P. Clark

ency, political opportunism, and special-commodity interests where they would have most effect. He has played anti-Communism as his long suit. Therefore, he had no trouble discerning that the events in Korea would quickly bring the issue of aid to Spain to a climax. "I felt the turning point had come," Clark said, "when I talked to Senator Pepper and found that he was thinking along the same lines as we were."

The authors called at Clark's smartly furnished suite of offices at Dupont Circle the afternoon Senator Kilgore futilely tried to get the Senate to reconsider. Clark was confident of the outcome. Presently Representative Eugene J. Keogh of New York telephoned.

"Keogh says Wherry just slapped down Lucas by refusing to allow unlimited debate on reconsidering the loan vote. He wants to know if Wherry thinks Lucas has changed his mind. How should I know? Maybe Wherry thinks Lucas is trying to pull a *coup d'état*."

Keogh is a Democrat from Brooklyn who, on issues other than Spain, has a highly consistent pro-Administration voting record. Last fall, while a member of a group that visited Spain and conferred with Franco, he gained particular prominence when his pants and wallet were stolen. But the experience did not sour him (he got them back, anyhow); Keogh has been actively engaged in preparing arguments to be used in the Spanish-aid debate.

We telephoned Keogh at his office and put several questions to him.

"My position on Spain is well known," he replied to the first. "It is motivated by the best interests of the United States."

What was his relationship with Clark? "Maybe I phoned him, maybe I didn't. I called a lot of people that day. But I always try to help my friends, and not my enemies."

A loan given to an unscrupulous government like Franco's will be difficult to supervise. ECA experts are not yet sure what supervisory powers they will hold, since the loan is specifically directed to a country outside the OEEC grouping and with none of the contingent obligations. It is not unlikely that portions of it, like the money lent to Chiang Kai-shek, may return to this country in unexpected ways—particularly to be used in lobbying for more money. Already a drive is under way to include Spain in the President's emergency four-billion-dollar arms program for Europe.

The post-Korean "this-is-it" atmosphere on Capitol Hill, the equivocal stand and unjustified complacency of the State Department, and the coyness of the Pentagon have all conspired to bring Spain into the western community in a tangible way long before the United Nations takes up the question.

Senator Morse concluded his speech against the loan amendment with: "Mr. President, if I thought that by this loan we would save the life of a single American boy, I would pay a bribe to Franco to save that life. However, I fear that this loan will be an aid to lying Russian propaganda about us. I fear that this loan will raise doubts as to our devotion to the principles of freedom. I fear that this loan will not stand the judgment of history."

—WILLIAM V. SHANNON
AND DOUGLASS CATER

Franco's Spanish Enemies

And His U. S. Friends

"Spain is again a Kingdom, under monarchists although not monarchic rule."—From the official Handbook of Spain.

A student seeking the meaning of this apparent doubletalk could have found it in the town of Ocana, forty miles south of Madrid, one morning near the end of last March. Ocana is where the government keeps its political prisoners, and this morning eighteen of them were on trial before a military tribunal for crimes against the security of the state. Two of the defendants were of particular importance: Antonio Castano, chief of the underground anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional de Trabajo, who was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison; and Antonio Trigo Mairal, onetime Socialist governor of Madrid, who was sentenced to two. Nine months earlier Castano and Trigo had been arrested in a café on the outskirts of Madrid while in conversation with "a certain monarchist general." The three had been the leaders of the Comité Interior de Coordinación, through which the monarchists and the underground parties of the Left hope to bring about the overthrow of Generalissimo Franco. The third man at the meeting, the monarchist general, had not been arrested. Nor was his name mentioned at the trial, although it was known to everybody present. Since Franco has declared Spain a monarchy, he has had to treat as his loyal opposition those who believe a monarchy should have a monarch, even when they conspire with forces he considers dangerously disloyal.

This circumstance gives to opposition politics almost a tongue-in-cheek quality—and incidentally makes Americans understandably suspicious of the monarchists' sincerity. The prison treatment of *rojo* offenders (all varieties of republicans are "Reds") is

severe enough, but when some flagrant breach of political etiquette makes it needful to incarcerate a highborn person, the prisoner is made as comfortable as possible and often has the services of his household staff. The sincerity of most of Franco's monarchist opponents is no more open to question than the miserable condition of the Spanish common people, but hostility to Franco is usually balanced by suspicion of Franco's other enemies. Few monarchists do not prefer Franco to the republic he overthrew. Few republicans now co-operating with the monarchists would not try to undermine the monarchy as soon as it was back. The wonder is that they have co-operated at all.

Americans who think of a new Spanish government in terms of the 1931-1936 republic might as well yearn for the Southern Confederacy. The Spanish government in exile is as dead as Jeff Davis, and not even the staunchest republican would argue that Spain could go back to republican government without some sort of transition. It is the character and guaranteed duration of this transition that has kept Franco's opponents arguing, while Franco has cleverly extended the argument by occasionally dropping a hint that he was thinking of restoring the monarchy himself.



The elements of a post-Franco government—and of post-Franco political evolution—are to be found on Spanish soil, some of them to be found among Franco's former and even present supporters. An irony of General Franco's rule is that while he has ruthlessly tried to suppress the remnants of his republican opposition, almost every variation of political thought that existed under the republic has re-emerged under the dictatorship. It is another irony, more to the dictator's taste, that these variations are as suspicious of one another



as they were in the past, so that co-operation for a specific purpose—getting rid of Franco—has been hampered by jockeying for position in the race that would start when he was out of the way. A good many of Franco's non-republican critics have restrained their enthusiasm on the theory that Franco was making their future task easier for them.

Nevertheless, Franco's departure



Indalecio Prieto

would probably be welcomed, if not assisted, by that element of the Catholic Church which looks to Bishop Herrera of Málaga for spiritual guidance, and whose political arm is the left wing of the Catholic Action. It is generally supposed that Franco's shrewd young Minister of Labor, José Antonio Girón, who has a popular as well as a Falangist following, is looking beyond the dictator's political lifetime. The traditional monarchists have their loyal generals among Franco's civil-war commanders, most notably and openly Generals Varela, Aranda, and Kindelán. It is estimated that of the two and a half million workers who once paid dues to the two great unions, the anarcho-sindicalist CNT and the socialist UGT, some fifty thousand still remain loyal to the underground organizations. Basque and Catalan nationalisms are still strong in Spain, and the Basque government in exile enjoys more prestige than what is left of the Spanish one. Among the exiles who might take part in a post-Franco reorganization, the

only ones of importance are the old socialist Indalecio Prieto, who lives in France, the right-wing republican leader José María Gil Robles, who lives in Portugal, and, of course, the Pretender, Don Juan, Count of Barcelona.

Don Juan is a tall, handsome, well-muscled man in his middle thirties who lives with his wife and two half-grown boys in a villa on Monte Estoril in Portugal. He keeps himself fit by sailing, and doubtless spends a good deal of time at sea thinking about what he would do if he were king. He is intelligent, democratic, and well liked by most of the people who know him. (General Franco is an exception.) He would probably make as good a king as any of the present and would-be holders of that office. It is unfortunate for him that in these days kingship is not highly regarded in international political circles. Yet he has managed gradually to attract the allegiance—some of it tentative—of most of the forces of opposition to the Franco Government. He has not yet got them all.

Don Juan's great political and moral advantage is that he took no part in the civil war (his boyish effort to do so has been conveniently forgotten); therefore, according to his supporters, both republican and nonrepublican anti-Francoists could unite under his symbolic leadership. His great disadvantage is that he is too young to have had any real personal popularity in Spain; besides, the institution of the monarchy itself has small hold on the Spanish people. The Pretender has promised, if restored, to submit a liberal constitution to the people and to abide by their decision (i.e., if they reject it, to write another), but he has not offered to put the question of monarchy itself to popular vote. "A little majority," he said to a visitor recently, with an eye on Belgium, "is no good for a king."

The monarchists claim that with a "reasonable" time in which to restore liberal political institutions and a liberal economy, and with economic help from the United States, they could make the monarchy so popular that the people would endorse it. Their republican co-operators are willing to go along with the experiment, provided the time appears reasonable to them, on the theory that under liberal political institutions the people will eventu-

ally get the government they want. But the monarchists mistrust republican promises of support for even a limited time, and the republicans doubt whether monarchist devotion to liberal principles would long survive a return to power. The skepticism of both sides is natural and probably well founded, and it has kept the two groups arguing during a good deal of the time when they might have presented a united



José María Gil Robles

front. Don Juan did the cause of unity no good when he went yachting with General Franco two years ago; in fact, the monarchists have often appeared as willing to make a deal with Franco as with the republicans. But in the last year or so, as Franco has seemed to commit himself to a policy of rule and ruin, both sides have shown a growing disposition to trust each other. The chances are that with a little prodding they would settle their remaining differences quickly.

Spaniards of the opposition, monarchists and republicans alike, complain that the United States government doesn't seem to understand the situation, particularly in so far as it has failed to see any alternative to Franco. "How," they ask, "could you expect a visible opposition in a country under such a dictatorship?" They then point to the committee of monarchists and leftists functioning on Spanish soil; to the cordial relations of the left wing of the Church with the Vatican, which

also cordially receives Don Juan; and to the restiveness of even a part of the Falange, which might cancel out the rabid wing that would fight for fascism if it could. That some of these elements of opposition are antagonistic to one another, all willingly concede, following the concession with another rhetorical question: "What is democracy but a way of reconciling political antagonisms?"

The United States could probably have had any sort of régime it wanted in Spain—if it could only have made up its mind what it wanted. There have been two periods when the United States could most effectively have exerted pressure. The first was immediately after the war, when most Spaniards, in and out of the government, expected the United States to use the pressure of its Army in Europe. The other time is the present, when Franco's economic bungling has reduced the country to desperation. The wheat crop has failed to come up to expectations, and the government has been freeing other foods from control in a last-ditch effort to feed the country without spending the rest of its gold. But exactly when the United States was in the strongest bargaining position, the Senate decided to give the Franco régime a loan with no strings attached.

The U.S. Administration has all alone been reluctant to make up its mind about Spain, partly through inertia, partly through confusion—much of it lobby-inspired—and partly through the artless notion that Franco is a protection against Communism. Franco is an encouragement to Communism, since he suppresses all other alternatives to present misery. By the tactics of infiltration he has reduced the underground Communist Party to a hard little nucleus, but a nucleus may be all that is needed if war again comes to Europe, or even if it does not. The western democracies are no longer popular with the common people of Spain, as any American can quickly learn by talking to a dozen or two. They expected to be liberated after the rest of western Europe, and no argument can convince them that they were not betrayed. The danger in Spain is that a people denied rescue by their friends will believe the promise of rescue by their enemies.

The State Department has tried to persuade Franco to liberalize his régime, and got nowhere. No matter how hard up his country is, Franco knows that a free Spain would not tolerate him. The U.S. government has always been skeptical of the ability of a monarchist-republican coalition to take and hold power. To take power and hold it, such a coalition would have had to convince the Spanish Army—which alone can remove Franco against his will—of its ability to get U.S. economic aid. The two conditions have once more demonstrated that there can be no chicken without the egg, and no egg without the chicken.

The United States could have materialized an egg by promising specific financial aid to any régime that restored basic freedoms in Spain. It could have put insurance on its investment by making the continuance of aid contingent upon the progressive satisfaction of its conditions, including honest elections. Such a policy might have hatched a monarchic chicken, or it might have hatched something with liberal feathers and army spurs, but that would still have been better than what is strutting around Spain now.

These were some of the possibilities that lay within the power of our government until a short while ago—when the Senators decided that they had no objection to giving unconditional support to the Franco régime.

—CHARLES WERTENBAKER



How Strong Is the Red Air Force?

In his article "On Overestimating the Enemy" (The Reporter, August 15), H. A. DeWeerd, citing Second World War experience with the Axis, cautioned strongly against "panicky overestimation" of Russian strength. The evaluation of Russian air power is particularly difficult because of meager statistics and conflicting interpretations of them by various experts. The following article presents what its author believes to be the most credible of those statistics and interpretations.

—The Editors

The Russian Air Force has not made a full-scale appearance in the Korean war, and the chances are that it won't. The planes now operated by the North Koreans are for the most part late Second World War Soviet models. It is the consensus of many air experts that the Third World War will not be a real threat until the Soviet Air Force considers itself ready for action. According to these same experts that date will not be until sometime after 1952.


An average of the best estimates today gives the Russian Air Force approximately sixteen to eighteen thousand first-line aircraft—about ten thousand operational planes and the rest in stand-by reserve. The United States Air Force has about nine thousand operational aircraft, eight thousand more in reserve squadrons, and another seventeen thousand in mothballs. Our Navy has about eleven thousand planes of all types, of which

eight thousand are in operational or reserve squadrons.

Estimates of Russian production go as high as fifty thousand airplanes a year. Production now is probably higher than it was in the war years, for the satellite nations are contributing heavily. Such ex-Nazi plants as Walter (rocket engines) in Prague; Messerschmitt in Hungary, Romania, and Silesia; and Junkers, Dornier, and Heinkel in eastern Germany are operating at capacity.

While the Russians are undoubtedly producing some Second World War-type planes, extensive retooling and re-equipment have taken place in the postwar years. A British authority, Asher Lee, credits the Soviets with a current output of "not less than seventy-five hundred single- and twin-jet aircraft a year . . . ten thousand . . . a year should be reached soon." Production of the Soviet version of the B-29 he estimates at fifteen hundred a year, with two thousand yearly as the goal. In addition to line bombers and fighters, Lee says the Russians are probably turning out one thousand twin-engine transport craft somewhat larger and faster than our old DC-3. The most interesting aviation news which has leaked out of the U.S.S.R. recently is word of a six-engined B-36-type bomber in the prototype stage.

Some experts take sharp issue with Lee. In March, 1950, the magazine *Aviation Week* estimated annual Rus-



sian strategic-bomber output at 180 and the Red output of "tactical aircraft for ground support" at one thousand. But many observers consider Lee's figures more reliable, since he usually acts as the unofficial spokesman of British air intelligence.

Sheer numbers have very little meaning in evaluating the capabilities of any military force; it is matériel, personnel, design, maintenance, and flexibility of command that count, as the Luftwaffe and the R.A.F. demonstrated during the Battle of Britain.

According to the latest information, Soviet equipment is good, perhaps as good as the best western designs. At least five military jet types are believed to be in production. These include a four-jet Ilyushin medium bomber, a twin-jet Tupolev bomber (probably the machine seen over the last Moscow May Day parade), a heavy twin-jet Mig-9 fighter, and the Yak-15 and Yak-17. A swept-back-wing jet, on the order of our F-86, also has been seen.

In addition the Russians are known to have imported and to be producing the German rocket Me-163, an extraordinary machine that can climb fifty thousand feet in 3.5 minutes.

In the bomber class the Soviet version of the B-29 is the mainstay, and the copy is generally considered to be a remarkably good job. It is credited to Tupolev. Jane's *All the World's Aircraft* remarks that the translation of the "actual aeroplane back to its production break-down is an engineering task of the first magnitude..." In 1946 Tupolev also designed a four-engined transport version of the B-29 with a seventy-two-place capacity (the Tu-

70). The military radius of the Russian B-29 is about fifteen hundred miles, as against the three-thousand-mile radius of the B-36.

In addition to these planes the Russians are probably turning out stock models of Second World War designs such as the famed Il-2 Stormovik attack bomber, and the piston-engined fighters Yak-9 and La-9, which compare somewhat with the German Messerschmitt 109 and Focke-Wulf 190. Many are going to Polish and Czechoslovakian units, while the Soviet first-line squadrons, of course, get the newest equipment.


Events in Korea have forcefully proven that piston-engined planes have a distinct place in ground-support operations. Although F-80 jets have made an impressive record against North Korean aircraft, and even tanks and heavy automotive equipment, they were never designed as ground-support planes, and the high speeds at which they must be flown lessen their effectiveness. Hence the Air Force has put in a hurry call for Second World War-model piston-engined planes, which have sufficient fuel to fly from Japan and operate on the target for long periods of time. This the land-based jets are not able to do.

Navy carrier-based Grumman F9F jets have made an excellent showing in Korea largely because they operate from bases close at hand. Jets are fuel hogs, of course, particularly at the relatively slow speeds and low altitudes which ground-support work requires, but with their refueling stations—carriers—nearby, Navy jets can stay in the target area for comparatively long periods.

It can be seen that the Soviet Air Force has been putting great emphasis on fighters and interceptors for tactical work with the Red Army and the attacking of enemy bomber formations. But today there are many reasons

to believe that the Soviets have begun concentrating on heavy bombers. Even more ominous, perhaps, are reports of Russian developments in the field of guided missiles.

Air power, simply defined, means



control of air space, denying it to the enemy, and employing it for your own purposes. In post-Second World War doctrine, absolute command of the air means denying the enemy the space to employ any of his weapons: artillery shells, rifle bullets, or aerial bombs. Absolute denial—not merely effective denial—has become the goal.

Considering the aircraft as a projectile is the key to the new thinking. A plane can, of course, be stopped in flight by ground-to-air fire and air-to-air fire. In the first, the record of anti-aircraft gunners before the introduction of the proximity fuze and radar sights was, to say the least, spotty. Not only did gunners have to calculate the plane's speed, course, altitude, intent, and so forth, but also the characteristics of the gun and the mathematics of trajectory, plus the delicate business of timing the explosion of the shell. As far as most pilots were concerned, early AA did much to clutter up the atmosphere, but generally could be avoided by planned weaving through an infested area.

The radar sight, coupled with the proximity fuze, has changed all that—so much so that one admiral stated recently he would guarantee any ship's safety from air attack, given modern anti-aircraft armament. Radar sighting, of course, goes a long way toward solving the problem of aiming the anti-aircraft gun, while the proximity fuze—a remarkable piece of radar equipment in the shell which explodes the projectile in the vicinity of the target—eliminates the problem of time fuzeing.

While ground-to-air gunnery has improved in the past seven years, keeping pace with military-plane speeds (which have doubled in the same time), recent rocket developments have surprised most military observers. Rockets were used considerably, of course, during the war—the V-2, the bazooka, and the Tiny Tim among others. They had many advantages, the chief being enormous striking power at minimum cost of projection equipment. The eleven-inch Tiny Tim, for example, needed only to be hung on an airplane to be fired, in place of the massive equipment of the rifle, turret, ship platform, and sighting gear needed to shoot an eleven-inch naval projectile. On the other hand, the

trajectory of a rocket is unreliable, and aiming it is quite a problem.

Today, the problems of aiming rockets and increasing their ranges are well on the way to being solved. The U.S. military investigation into rocketry has been split up roughly into four general fields: air-to-air rockets, air-to-ground rockets, ground-to-air rockets, and ground-to-ground rockets.



Sovfoto

Air armada over Moscow

Perhaps the most successful research to date has been done in the air-to-air field; the so-called "Mighty Mouse"—a 2.75-inch weapon armed with a proximity fuze—has proved itself sufficiently to be scheduled for both interceptor and bomber installation. The B-36 will include this rocket along with standard guns and cannon. "Mighty Mouse's" effective range may be as great as five miles, while a range of thirty-five miles has been suggested as the ultimate goal.

In the ground-to-air field, the Navy is testing one guided missile called the "beam rider," which can change its course as a plane goes into evasive tactics. Another ground-to-air instrument is the homing variety of rocket which carries a searching apparatus in its structure, and hence is relatively independent of ground control. Still another variation is a "slave" missile; ground radar tracks both target and the rocket, while ground control corrects the latter's path.

In the ground-to-ground field it is believed that the heavy V-2 type of equipment has been considerably improved both in range and accuracy, but little has been announced.

The Russians have been as quiet about their guided-missile progress as about almost everything else, but it is believed they have been very successful in developing the heavy V-2 types. For one thing Russia may have skimmed off the cream of the German experts, and for another the Russians have been building enormous rocket installations up and down their western borders, particularly in the Baltic Sea area.

The bomber and even the interceptor plane, pitted against an effective rocket defense system, would seem to stand a slim chance of survival. Even the high performance required in modern aircraft turns out to be double-edged, since sonic speeds no longer are an absolute defense against a radar-guided-missile attack, and are a physical handicap to the pilot.

Hence the pilot-flown airplane may turn out to be too big, cumbersome, and vulnerable for bombing and interception. The guided missile now threatens to take over command of the air; and the Russians, even without the benefit of our advanced aviation knowledge, may be able to challenge us for command of the air through

supersonic rockets. For Russia, according to the best available information, is just as well advanced in the rocket business as we are, if not better. Here again expert opinions vary. The British consider the Russians are still behind in rocketry, while some Americans violently disagree, but do hold the Soviets to be far astern in certain branches of basic research.

Reporters have frequently noted that until recently Russian planes avoided flying at night or in bad weather, and from this inferred that the Russians were delinquent in instrument flying techniques and electronic flying equipment. Today it is inconceivable that the new Russian jet aircraft and guided missiles could be operated without the aid of modern electronics. There is no explanation: The Russians simply have displayed the Soviet characteristic of tackling an enormous problem and coming up with a facsimile of a solution in the minimum time. It might be recalled that the Japanese did the same.

It has been stated frequently that Russian resources cannot fulfill the requirements of maintaining both a large air force and a semimechanized Red Army. Oilmen, for example, estimate Soviet petroleum production at half a million barrels a day, as against the American output of six million barrels. Soviet synthetic-oil production, they believe, is only in its elementary stages, and furthermore, the type of coal best suited for it is only found in reasonable quantities in Poland. Again, it might be recalled that both Japan and Germany faced somewhat similar shortages before entering the Second World War.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Air Force today is a continental force, best equipped for tactical support of the Red Army rather than for strategic bombing. The important point is that by 1952 the Soviets may well consider their air force to be master of the Eurasian air. A little more practice in the use of new weapons, a heavy increase in production, and the Soviet Union might have the smoothest-working air force on earth. The dangerous time will come at the moment when the Politburo believes that the Russians are able to command the air against any opposition on the face of the globe.

—ALBERT DOUGLAS

I Was a Prisoner Of the MVD



The dubious privilege of observing the workings of the Soviet Ministry of Home Affairs—the MVD—at close range has left me impressed by its power but somewhat scornful of its efficiency. During the three and a half years I spent as a prisoner of the MVD in eastern Germany, I found its techniques cumbersome and ponderous, and its officers lacking in both specialized training and intelligence.


In April of 1945, while fighting was still going on in Zehlendorf, the suburb of Berlin where I was living, I had the misfortune to stumble into a regimental counterespionage unit of what was then still known as the NKVD, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. "A neutral journalist, eh?" said my first interrogator as he looked through my papers. "All journalists are spies. You will be detained."

This military unit of the Soviet secret police was called a *smersh*—an honorary title, coined by Stalin, which is a contraction of the Russian phrase for "death to all spies." I was "detained" (but never "arrested") by one *smersh* after another, on suspicion of being an American spy, until my escape in September, 1948. I had served as an economic adviser at the American Embassy in Berlin for fourteen years, and I had contributed to several American publications; during the war I was a correspondent for a Swiss newspaper. To the MVD this made me a spy, even though specific evidence of my espionage activities could never be found. "Do you really expect me to believe," one officer asked, "that a Swiss newspaper is going to the expense of maintaining a numerous staff of foreign correspondents merely to

please its readers? No, you cannot fool us, we know that all these so-called foreign correspondents are paid by the British and American foreign services." The fact that I spoke several European languages also weighed heavily against me. "Only a spy," I was told, "would need to know so many languages." With endless monotony during several hundred hours of interrogation, I was given demonstrations of this sort of reasoning by MVD officers ranging in rank from ambitious young lieutenants to a major general. Curiously enough, certain anti-Bolshevik activities which I had been engaged in during the Russian Revolution, and my decision to emigrate from the Soviet Union in 1921, were not held against me during these questionings.

For the first six months of my imprisonment I was thrown in with Russian Army officers who had been released from German prison camps and immediately transferred to Soviet ones. According to the MVD, a Russian soldier who allows himself to be taken prisoner is a traitor. At a camp near Dresden I made friends with two colonels—men of excellent character and education—who, after their liberation by the Americans, had taken charge of ten thousand fellow prisoners, disciplined them, organized their rationing, and secured transportation for them to the Soviet Zone—where they were all thrown into jail. My friends had made matters worse by admitting their contact with the Americans. This in itself was a serious offense.

Having decided, perhaps on the basis of Russian procedure, that all journalists were spies, the MVD was then somewhat uncertain about what to do with me. I am convinced that my dossier never included any facts about my past life which I did not provide myself. Ordinary police techniques would have turned up much material



which would undoubtedly have seemed very important to the MVD, even though it would have had nothing to do with the charge of espionage. For instance, a routine check of newspaper files would have revealed that in the Soviet purge trials of the 1930's, Leo Jurowsky, President of the Soviet State Bank, testified that he had met me in Germany to receive three million marks for counterrevolutionary wrecking work in the Soviet Union. Actually, I had not seen Jurowsky since 1912, and I am sure that he picked my name out of the air so as not to damage any others, and because he knew that I was fairly safe in Germany. But for over three years—all the time the MVD held me—I expected this evidence to be brought up against me.

I discovered that several of my cellmates had even more dangerous skeletons in their closets. Of course, from the MVD's point of view, the subtleties of innocence or guilt are of no great importance, since the prisoner is, at any rate, to be detained indefinitely. But I sometimes wonder how they would go about catching a really clever operative in their broad but coarse nets. It is perhaps not surprising that a machine whose major function is to extirpate free thought is weak when independent, imaginative thinking is required of its functionaries.

I do not flatter myself that the MVD men were interested in me as an individual. They were interested only in the information I might provide about the personnel and techniques of the American espionage system. After eight months of sporadic questioning, I was taken to Dresden in December, 1945, to play my big scene—a thorough investigation which lasted more than

eight hours a day for six consecutive days.

My interrogator, a major whose entire head was shaved bare, after the fashion set by high-ranking Soviet officers, demonstrated the MVD's pathological concern for meticulous (and generally useless) informational frills. "Now tell me," said the major, "but be sure to make it complete and not to omit any detail, the names of all Europeans and Americans with whom you have had dealings since you left the Soviet Union." As a journalist, I had, of course, known thousands of people, and I saw no particular harm in providing such a list for the MVD files. So I began. After a while the major told me to stop; he was tired of the business. He nevertheless declared that only a spy could have had so many international connections.

The major and I, it turned out, had attended the same school in Leningrad—the Polytechnic Institute—and he always opened our discussions with a humorous reference to the old school, or a bit of gossip about literary life in Moscow. At our first meeting he offered me a cigarette and said, "I know that some of our people think they can obtain the best results by being rude with prisoners, by shouting at them and threatening them. Personally I do not hold with this method. You can obtain much more by talking to people in a quiet and friendly way and by gaining their confidence." As time went on, and I became more familiar with the two types of MVD interrogators, I reached the conclusion that the rough ones, who tried to intimidate their prisoners by all means short of


actual torture, proved in the end to be more decent than the "friendly" ones. The latter, by their efforts to elicit "evidence" with such remarks as "But really, there is no harm in admitting this," proved to be the more dangerous. In the words of an old Russian proverb: "He makes the bed soft for you, but it's hard to sleep on it."

The jovial major in Dresden was the only one of my numerous interrogators who offered me a chair near his desk. The usual ritual was for the prisoner to sit on a chair in the middle of the room—probably to prevent him from peering at the papers on the officer's desk. In one respect, all prisoners who smoked looked forward to being interrogated, for this was the only occasion on which they were almost certain to get a cigarette or two. As a matter of routine, probably backed by some deep psychological consideration, practically all MVD officers, whether of the "friendly" or intimidating type, would offer their subjects a cigarette as a preliminary to their questionings.

Americans who criticize their government for red tape and unnecessary paper work would never tolerate the wasteful procedures I observed in the MVD. After my interrogation the major spent two and a half days writing up a voluminous and fruitless report on my case in his own hand. The MVD scrupulously regards the legal rights of every prisoner by showing him a copy of this "protocol," as it is called—and then obliging him to sign each page to verify it as a true record of his statements. Many of my cellmates, returning from the ceremony of reading and signing their protocols, told me that they had signed their names to gross and incriminating distortions of their testimony.

"But why did you sign?" I would ask. "Why didn't you insist on a correction?" The answer would be a shrug of the shoulders. And yet these documents sealed their fates, since the military tribunal would pass judgment in their cases on the basis of the protocols and whatever the *prokuror* had to say. Needless to say, there was no counsel for the defense, and no right of appeal. The helpless resignation of the Russian people to the MVD comes, I believe, as a psychological dividend to the years of terror. The secret police no longer find it necessary to resort to





the extremes of physical violence that were usual during the first two decades of Communist rule. The Russian people submit to the MVD much as the farmer submits to drought or high winds.

Fortunately, my captors did not give up their belief that I was an American spy and their hope that some day I might break down and tell them the whole story. This saved me from being assigned to forced labor, and permitted me to languish more or less comfortably in German prisons until my escape. During the last fifteen months of my stay with the MVD, I lived quite elegantly in the MVD's Headquarters Compound at Potsdam, only a stone's throw from Cecilienhof Palace, where the Big Three met in 1945. My quarters were in the attic of the house which had been the home of an eminent German violinist, Professor Kulenkampf, before he left Germany to find refuge in Switzerland. Although I have never met him, I always think of Herr Kulenkampf with fondness. For over a year I amused myself by reconstructing his life from the stacks of his receipted bills, which the MVD gave me for toilet paper.

My food was quite good during this period, and my guards were two extremely polite MVD soldiers. The extravagance of assigning two strapping young fellows in their early twenties to do nothing but guard one man over sixty was typical of the MVD. They were not relieved for a single day during the whole fifteen months, and were, in fact, prisoners like myself.

At Potsdam I was denied one pleasure which I had enjoyed previously. Once a week I had been taken to the movies. No one, I am sure, has such a high opinion of American espionage activities as the makers of Soviet films. In nearly every Sovkino spy film, agents of the wicked and resourceful foreign *razvedkas*—obviously Americans—were apt to pop up anywhere. To be sure, the valiant Soviet counterspy always appeared at the end, like the Greek *deus ex machina*, to put things right. But he was never very convincing, and the pictures only contribute, I am sure, to the fearful admiration the Soviet people have for all foreign intelligence services. Lawrence of Arabia has become a popular hero among Soviet youth.

The MVD's fixation on American spies makes its personnel overlook more ordinary dangers. Lying on my divan one afternoon, I saw a bedbug among the cushions and got up to investigate. Under one of the cushions I found a loaded German Army pistol. My discovery troubled me. Was it a plant to test whether I would tell my captors about the weapon? This seemed the most plausible explanation. Even if the pistol were not a plant, there was no place for a gun in the plan of escape which was then taking shape in my mind. I called the guard and told him that I had something to report to the major in charge. The major seemed genuinely surprised. He volunteered the theory that the divan had come from some German house where a Nazi officer had hidden his pistol when


the Red Army moved in. I asked the major whether my discovery was not important enough to warrant a written report. "Oh, no, it's not worth it," he replied, slipping the gun into his pocket.

My two guards had a radio which usually ran at full blast from six AM to one AM. They listened to "Volga," the radio station of the Soviet Army of Occupation in Germany. But at certain hours they did not object if I tuned in on RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin), the Voice of America, or European stations. In this way I was not only well posted on what was going on in the world, which was of some morale value, but I was also able to get information which proved to be of decisive value in crossing the zonal boundary after my escape.

My escape from the Headquarters Compound of the MVD in Potsdam was made possible by MVD negligence rather than by any special skill or strength on my part. It was while the guard on duty was fast asleep in his chair, in the early hours of September 5, 1948, that I eased myself out of the window and down a drainpipe into the garden. The only obstacle I had to overcome then was a wooden fence about ten feet high. The fence had been built with a smooth surface on the outside of the compound, but with two horizontal two-by-fours as braces on the inside, so that even an unathletic man of advanced years was able to climb over it.

The MVD had built the fence around the prison compound to keep people out; it was no good for keeping them in.

—WALDEMAR HOFFEDING



Does Stalin Really Want Red China in the U. N.?

Last January, when the Soviet Union moved to expel the Chinese Nationalists from the United Nations, it seemed that the Kremlin had decided to make a full-scale effort to get Mao Tse-tung's Peking government a permanent seat on the Security Council.

The Soviet action appeared somewhat "premature" to Sir Alexander Cadogan, then British representative on the council, even though his government had recognized the Chinese Communists. But most observers at Lake Success agreed that it would not be too long before Russia had its way.

At about this time the New York *Times* reported from Lake Success: "It appears to be a matter of weeks before France and Egypt recognize Communist China." This would have created a majority of seven votes in the council (the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Great Britain, India, and Norway had already recognized Mao) for unseating the Nationalists.

Even if France did not immediately recognize Red China, diplomats at the U.N. knew that Jean Chauvel, the French representative on the council, was seeking a way to break the deadlock that had been created when the Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council and other U.N. bodies because of its defeat on the China issue. Chauvel's argument that members of the council had obligations not only toward their own governments but also to the U.N. was interpreted to mean that countries which had not recognized Mao could nevertheless vote for his admission to the U.N.

As for the United States, the State Department had been behaving quite coolly toward the Nationalist régime. On her last visit to Washington, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek had received only a modest reception, in contrast with the effusive demonstrations of the past.

The U.S. White Paper on China had strongly denounced Chiang's régime for its "corruption and ineptitude."

At precisely this time Mao chose to alienate the American and the French governments. The very week that Malik staged his walkout, the Chinese Communists seized American, French, and Dutch diplomatic properties in Peking. The next week Peking announced the recognition of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China.

The reaction in Paris and Washington was exactly what could have been expected. When Mao officially gave support to a man whom the French had branded as a rebel, and who for years had tied down the better part of France's armed forces in the jungles of Indo-China, any suggestions for compromise had to be rejected by the French. The United States attitude stiffened, and the deadlock was complete.

Secretary-General Trygve Lie considered the situation so dangerous that he held persistent consultations in January and February with the Security Council delegates. His legal experts prepared and circulated a memorandum designed to convince the U.N. that it should allow Mao's régime—which controlled continental China—to represent that country. Lie's efforts were seconded by India and Yugoslavia.

Moscow, by its walkout, had given an ultimatum to the rest of the world. In Washington, the shock of Russian "blackmail" strengthened Chiang's supporters. The Secretary-General saw no way out of the impasse except to intervene with the great powers personally. Lie decided to call for a "periodic meeting" of the Security Council (as provided in the U.N. Charter) at which Foreign Ministers or even heads of governments would sit.

Lie took this plan to Washington, where he received only a lukewarm reception. It was April, and Dean Acheson and the State Department were under their most savage attacks from Senator McCarthy. Lie left on April 22 for Paris, London, and Moscow. In Paris, the diplomatic reaction was considerably more favorable.

However, a few days later, disturbing news arrived from Indo-China. Mao Tse-tung had established a "liaison office" with Ho Chi Minh, and press dispatches indicated a step-up in Red China's aid to the Viet Minh forces.

This hardly helped Lie, but he persisted. On his return to Lake Success on May 25, he was hopeful. He reported a general agreement in the four capitals to try everything possible to put an end to the "cold war." Although not previously reported, the fact is that he had received some assurances in Paris and in London that a way could be found to unseat the Nationalists.

The Secretary-General could then call for a "periodic meeting" at which all Security Council members would take part. The scene would be Geneva. This would eliminate any technical difficulties connected with the entry of delegates from Communist China into the United States before the Communist régime had any official status in the United Nations. Dr. Max Petitpierre, the President of Switzerland, had promised Lie that the Swiss would issue visas to Mao's envoys.

The date of the Geneva meeting was tentatively set for July 27. Lie was to leave for Europe on June 30. It was reported from London that Great Britain would raise the question of Chinese representation in the Economic and Social Council when it met in Geneva on July 3.

The stage seemed set. Some western diplomats even expressed the hope that

Mao would eliminate all hesitations by attacking Formosa. In view of the American "hands-off" policy, they felt the island would be no match for a well-trained Communist Army. The Nationalist collapse on Hainan appeared to justify this prediction.

An attack came on June 25, but not in Formosa. Two days later, the whole political and military picture had changed. The Security Council adopted sanctions against the North Koreans. The U.S. Seventh Fleet took interdictory positions around Formosa. Lie canceled his trip.

By this time, the various moves made or inspired by Moscow since January appeared to have had not only the result, but the aim of preventing a Peking delegate from sitting in the United Nations.

Malik's return to the Security Council does not necessarily mean that Stalin has decided on a change of policy. Malik's moves have succeeded only in making it impossible even for those countries which recognize Peking to help unseat Nationalist China. Only India and Yugoslavia voted with the U.S.S.R on August 1 in favor of Malik's arbitrary ruling from the chair that the Nationalist delegate did not represent China in the council. Great Britain and Norway, both advocates of Peking's admission, joined the majority in the Security Council opposing Malik's high-handed decision.


The feeling that Stalin does not, at least at the moment, want the Chinese Communists to have a place in the United Nations is strengthened by the knowledge that Moscow has little to gain by Mao's admission to a world forum. The Tito experience is certainly still vivid in Stalin's mind. And it may not be wrong to speculate that the presence of Yugoslavia in the world organization has made it more difficult—if not impossible—for the Kremlin to liquidate Tito.

The general trend of Soviet policy has consistently been one of more and more isolation from the western world. If, as the series of "incidents" that coincidentally prevented Peking's admission to the United Nations seem to indicate, Moscow really did not want Mao in close contact with the rest of the world and with the "rebels" from Yugoslavia, this would fit in with the trend.

—PETER J. ALLEN

Yugoslavia

The Plight of Tito



The war in Korea has raised new and grave problems for Marshal Tito, who had plenty of them already. Coinciding almost to the day with the second anniversary of his public defiance of Moscow, the Korean eruption endangered the prospects of the anti-Soviet Communism he has been laboriously trying to spread in other nations, damaged his relations with the United States at a time when they were already headed for a period of tension, and also threatened to precipitate economic difficulties in Yugoslavia even worse than those that plague it already.

Before June 25, Tito had repeatedly assured foreign diplomats and newspapermen that he believed a long period of peace lay ahead. His foreign policy, which consisted largely of a tight-rope walking act between the American and Soviet blocs, was obviously based on this conviction. It was Tito's firm hope that heretical Communists in the West, within the Soviet bloc, and above all in China would rebel against the Russian Politburo and ally themselves with him.

But since the North Korean attack, Tito is not so sure that he will have the long, peaceful years needed for the uphill work of convincing important Communists outside Yugoslavia that the Belgrade government is the only true practitioner of Marxism-Leninism.

The Marshal's hopes die hard, and it may have been his dread of irrevocably alienating the Chinese party that led Ales Bebler, the Yugoslav delegate at

the U.N. Security Council, to vote against military action in Korea.

There are two other plausible explanations for Yugoslavia's voting in the first days of the U.N. debate on the Korean aggression. The line given "off the record" to western correspondents by the Belgrade government was that it feared doing anything that would give Moscow a pretext to attack.

Another explanation is that Tito had to be extremely careful of his own party's reaction. There have been persistent reports lately of increased pro-Cominform sympathy in the middle and lower ranks of the Yugoslav Communist hierarchy. This unrest is not believed to have assumed sizable proportions, but it is a constant danger.

Recently the Marshal and his press had been growing more and more violent in their attacks against Moscow and "the cult of Stalin." Some recent articles in Yugoslav journals out-Hearst Hearst in their acrimony toward the Kremlin. But Tito persistently maintained, during this anti-Soviet crescendo, that he still championed world Communism.

The events in Korea created the possibility that Tito would take the one action that could convince potential Cominformists in his party that he had



turned traitor to Communism. This would have been their inevitable conclusion if he had voluntarily allied himself with the "capitalist" states. Such a step would have created the greatest crisis within the Yugoslav party since Tito masterfully held it together in the critical first week of July, 1948, after Moscow excommunicated him.

In any case, the U.N. vote unquestionably harmed the Marshal in the United States at a time when favorable American opinion—and American economic assistance—was of great importance to him.

Americans not familiar with the intricacies of the Yugoslav position and those who thought there had been something fishy about the Tito-Stalin split all along cited the U.N. vote as proof that Yugoslavia was still in the Soviet camp. Those in the State Department who favor helping Tito for strategic and ideological reasons countered by pointing out that, once the vote was passed, the Marshal did not suggest that the U.N. decision was illegal. But his man's vote nonetheless strengthened the hand of those who oppose doing much for Belgrade.

This turn in American-Yugoslav relations coincided with increasing worry in Tito's entourage about the economic help Yugoslavia has been seeking from the United States and from the American-influenced World Bank—help that Tito has not been getting on anything like the scale he once hoped for.

A case in point is a loan from the World Bank that Yugoslavia has been anxiously awaiting for more than a year. In the spring of 1949 the Belgrade government indicated in a detailed memorandum that it wanted about \$250 million. The sum has been boiled down to about a tenth of that, some of it to be in French and Italian currencies, but even this small loan would help Tito right now. Negotiations are dragging, and there are signs they may continue to drag. Direct American help on a scale large enough to cure the economic disorders which are already prevalent would have to be authorized by Congress. Tito's backers in the State Department quail at the thought of what would happen to the present moderately pro-Tito policy if it were to be dissected by the Senate and the House.

One other prospect of real help for

Tito appeared in June when the Yugoslavs asked, with reasonable prospects of success, for large credits from the West German government. A delegation went to Bonn with a request for eighty to a hundred million dollars worth of capital equipment for delivery by 1952, payments to be made during the five following years. It was soon reported through U.S. channels that the West Germans, although very eager to get back into the Balkans commercially, would be unlikely to grant more than thirty million dollars at most in a contract of this type.

Now it is understood that the outbreak of the Korean conflict and the fear that Yugoslavia may be next on the Soviet aggression list have cooled the ardor of German businessmen for a long-term arrangement. Belgrade simply does not have the money or the raw materials to attract sizable shorter-term credits.

Even without the strain put on Yugoslavia by the Korean invasion, Tito's difficulties are imposing. The consumer-goods situation in Yugoslavia can only be described as desperate. Tito has sacrificed the daily needs of the population for his industrialization program to such an extent that five years after the war Yugoslavs cannot buy razor blades, toothbrushes, toothpaste, buttons, or scissors.

The result has been loud grumbling

in every city and village. Even pro-Tito Communists are outspokenly unhappy. The best they can think of to say is that "things are not going well at the moment."

Worse yet, the régime is threatened with a poor grain crop because of a bad spring drought. Peasants in Serbia, Croatia, and eastern Bosnia estimate their yield will be from sixty to seventy-five per cent of last year's. In present-day Yugoslavia, this amounts to catastrophe. Tito will be unlikely to fulfill his extensive grain-export commitments to Great Britain and West Germany, and there will also be hardship in the internal farm economy, which depends heavily on grain as an animal food. Finally, it will contribute to a further increase in food prices, many of which are already one hundred per cent above last year's. Some are higher. It would take twenty per cent of a city dweller's monthly salary to buy two pounds of butter.

The peasants cannot buy many of the simplest consumer items except at fabulous prices from the black market. In turn they sell their surplus products in the cities at fabulous prices. The city populations, eking out an existence on small fixed salaries, are helpless. All indications are that things will get worse.

These drastic troubles are not making it easy for the Yugoslavs to forget their many political grievances against



the Marshal—in a country where before the war there were only ten thousand Communists among sixteen million people. It is a case of a dictatorship in which even the bread and circuses are missing.

Two-thirds of the Marshal's spring program for friendship with Yugoslavia's three western neighbors—Austria, Italy, and Greece—has failed. Only in relations with Austria has there been any improvement.

In a speech delivered in Milan last April, Count Carlo Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, declared that Belgrade and Rome should stop wrangling over Trieste because the time might not be far off when Yugoslav and Italian troops would be side by side defending Zagreb and the Po Valley. Since then, Yugoslav-Italian relations have gone from mediocre to poor. Economic deals that normally are easily negotiated between neighboring régimes have repeatedly been snagged on the Trieste issue. There have been no detailed talks on the apportionment of the small, disputed bit of land around the port; there does not even appear to be agreement on the general framework for a discussion of the problem.

It was thought this spring that the settlement would be confined to the area near Trieste. Then Tito held up progress by hinting that he would like to have the entire question of the strategically important Italian-Yugoslav frontier north of Trieste reopened in his favor.

Tito's relations with Greece are also touchy. A recent row over the question of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece has kept the two countries from re-establishing normal diplomatic ties.

It looked as if there might be a *rapprochement* in May, before the Yugoslav Communists suddenly expressed paternal sentiments toward the Macedonian minority. The Greeks, including General Plastiras, replied heatedly that the minority did not even exist, because recognizing its existence would have been the opening wedge for future Yugoslav claims to Greek land. As a result, railway traffic between Belgrade and Athens has not been restored. This is the only rail line that links the interior of Yugoslavia with the Aegean port of Salonika and the



only line that gives Greece an overland rail link with western Europe.

There are no direct mail, telegraph, or telephone service between Yugoslavia and Greece. They have no Ministers in each other's capital.

This leaves Marshal Tito isolated in the Balkans. On his other frontiers—more than half the perimeter of Yugoslavia—he faces hostile Cominform states, which are continually touching off border flare-ups.

There has been a great deal of talk about Tito's "thirty divisions" and the determination of the fiery Yugoslav people to fight against a Russian or satellite aggression. The Hungarians, Romanians, and Albanians have negligible forces—probably not four divisions among them able to sustain an offensive. The Bulgarian Army, which must be taken more seriously, probably has eight divisions, one of them armored with Russian T-34 tanks and Soviet self-propelled guns. The feeble Hungarian force is believed to have one division which has also received some T-34's. Tito, on the other hand, has a regular army of about 350,000, plus other armed units of 150,000, and estimates are that he has enough rudimentary infantry weapons to mobilize another 750,000.

In the event of a direct Russian assault, however, the prospects—especially as to the reaction of the Yugoslav people—are much less optimistic. Military observers here do not know whether Marshal Tito would try to hold the flat, northeastern section of

the country, the Voivodina, which lies between Belgrade and the Hungarian and Romanian borders. These two borders are, respectively, one hundred miles and forty miles away from the capital.

If Tito were to commit much of his army, with its mediocre equipment, to this almost indefensible area, a large, highly mechanized Soviet force, with complete air superiority, would cut it to ribbons in the plains. But if the Voivodina were abandoned, Belgrade would necessarily fall in a few days.

The fighting might turn into a duplicate of the Marshal's partisan war against the Nazis. There does not, however, seem to be any strong will on the part of the population to engage in such a war. The prevailing mood is unlike that which led the Serbs to stage a heroic resistance in the streets of Belgrade in 1941.

During this summer's war scare the popular temper has been quite different. It was for the most part one of panic and despair among men and women in Belgrade, Zagreb, and the villages of Serbia and Croatia. A thirty-five-year-old railway worker in Belgrade said, "the Russians will use the atom bomb on us in Belgrade first, because they hate Tito so much."

In the face of all this trouble, the Marshal continues to display his extraordinary *sang-froid*. But there is probably no chief of state in Europe today who is confronted with a more difficult situation. —GASTON COBLENTZ

Needed: a Single Army of 40 Divisions

Everything can't be done at once. Since 1946, Europe has largely rebuilt its economy. In military preparedness it has made almost no progress.

Two years ago, faced with a threat that no longer could be ignored, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact and set up the first organization for the defense of Europe. Under this pact a committee functions in London, and the future Commanders-in-Chief are established at Fontainebleau. The commanders, however, command only a limited staff, which has drawn up plans, studied them at length, and altered them after discussion. But the effectiveness of plans depends, of course, upon the will—and capacity—of governments to implement them.

Last year the Atlantic Pact set up an even more important organization, which in addition to the nations of the Brussels Pact, included Mediterranean lands—Italy and North Africa—and northern ones—Norway and Denmark. It, too, can make plans, but unfortunately the plans are unrelated to the number of existing divisions.

If the Russians invaded western Europe today, what would they have to contend with? Between the Iron Curtain and the Rhine, a force equivalent to eight divisions (including two American divisions). This means simply that any surprise attack would immediately reach the Rhine. Then, behind that first precarious defense line, the aggressor would find hardly more than a few light French units, a Belgian detachment, and some very small Dutch forces. The British could intervene in the air, but would have no time to land troops in strength.

Why has Europe fallen to such tragic depths of weakness?

Because the Germans destroyed the military forces of the continent, and

because the countries that Germany occupied—France especially—have been unable to rebuild their strength.

For four years now, France has been fighting a war in Indo-China. This long struggle, encouraged by the Communists, has been represented even by some friends of France as an imperialist war. Its principal effect has been to absorb pretty much the whole of France's regular army.

The 125,000 French soldiers now fighting in Asia are not a cross section of the military draft: They are France's finest troops—professionals, noncommissioned officers, and officers; they represent a very considerable part of the trained French forces available.

For four years these men, assisted by the major part of the native population, have been fighting guerrilla bands which have neither tanks nor airplanes—and they have achieved no tangible results. This fact may suggest the extent of the effort that the Americans will have to make before they can drive back the North Koreans, who are not only fired with the same Communist fanaticism but also are equipped with both tanks and planes.

The Communist offensives in Asia—which have tied up strong British units in Malaya and now U.N. forces in Korea, in addition to the French in Indo-China—have been among the principal causes of present European military weakness.

The result is now obvious. Europe is secure against aggression only while the aggressor is held back by the fear of atomic reprisals.

Contrary to the earlier opinions of certain military experts, the Korean campaign has proved that air power alone cannot halt an invasion. Air power can vastly speed up the work of the ground forces when it is employed with great precision at the actual front. But there must be a certain number of

infantrymen before there can be a front.

To ward off the danger of a sudden attack, ground forces must hold the terrain; there must be a front to be held. The most generally accepted estimate on a force adequate to cope with a Russian attack in Europe is an immediately available field army of forty divisions, not counting reserves.

Even forty divisions can provide only thin cover on a front of seven hundred kilometers—about 450 miles. At present western Europe has eight divisions.

To get forty divisions, men are needed, of course, but money is needed also—a great deal of money.

We have seen that events in Asia not only are siphoning off American military forces but for four years have been preventing Europe's military recovery. We are considering lengthening the period of conscript service; by the end of the year that reform will probably be put into effect. But this will not immediately result in an increase in the number of armed units since, at first, there will be insufficient instructors and no trained cadres into which to place the inexperienced draftees.

Why not then call on Western Germany? Mr. John Foster Dulles recently proposed that we do so. In Western Germany there is a large body of war-trained men. It seems senseless not to use these men to defend an inheritance in which they have a share. We cannot forget that Germany held its own for three years not only against the enormous Russian mass—which it came near defeating—but also for a time against America's gigantic power. For ten months Germany held out on two fronts, against 270 Russian divisions, one hundred western Allied divisions—and overwhelming Allied air superiority. Although mutilated, diminished, and exhausted, Western



Press Association

All quiet for how long? Montgomery and de Lattre de Tassigny

Germany still represents an important potential. The question is not a simple one. The following is a French point of view that can be considered moderate:

First, it would be unjust, immoral, and imprudent to rearm Germany before rearming the Allies. In other words, German rearmament has lowest priority.

Second, German rearmament can begin only if the rest of western Europe feels secure about it. That guaranty can consist only in the tested authority of an effective Allied high command; it cannot be found in any mere "planning" organizations such as those which now exist in Europe.

It cannot be said that Europe, or France in particular, is blocking German rearmament. Europe's stand, and France's, is to ask that rearmament be made contingent on certain precautions—in view of a still-recent past and of the fact that German rearmament may involve the risk of Russia's going to war at once.

The problem of manpower is secondary to that of matériel, and payment for matériel. Forty divisions—if half of them are armored—require four to five thousand tanks. At the least, that means eight billion dollars.

If one hundred tactical planes support each division—a minimum estimate—that means four thousand planes, with their airfields and other facilities. That's at least another four billion dollars.

Twelve billion dollars is almost double the entire French national budget (seven billion dollars); it is more than double the combined military budgets of all the European Atlantic Pact nations: \$5.5 billion.

But twelve billion dollars is also very much less than the Soviet's military budget for 1950, which officially amounts to \$19,880,000,000.

This situation dominated the debates of the recent London conference of deputy Foreign Ministers and impelled President Truman to ask Congress for five billion dollars for Europe's rearmament, with the understanding that the Atlantic Pact nations would make a comparable effort.

The rearmament effort of the Atlantic Pact nations must not be permitted to ruin European economy, since it is useless to defend a country—or a continent—against outside attack if it collapses from within.

Three years ago, when reconstruction was only just starting, it would have been useless even to think in terms

of such sums. Today Europe is producing too much, rather than too little. Some nations will perhaps not be reluctant to subsidize their heavy industry with contracts for war matériel. The rearmament effort then may be accepted quite readily.

At the London conference a proposal was made for the creation of a common fund in which the member nations would pool their military outlays. Such a pool would provide the means for immediate action; it would give America, so to speak, the chairmanship of the board of directors for joint defense—a board which then could act effectively and swiftly.

In 1932, Paul Valéry, poet and prophet, wrote: "America must impose its happiness on Europe." The proposed pool gives America the opportunity to start imposing on Europe that "happiness" which consists in union and the forgetting of past quarrels. There are many signs that Europe is ready to accept such an imposition.

But the United States must dismiss the illusion that Europe by itself can create a federal army. It is too late now. What must now be created is a single, powerful Atlantic Army, in which, under U.S. leadership, the nations of Europe will become aware that they are a community.

What some Americans fear most in making military commitments is the presence of a Communist Fifth Column in Europe.

It is undeniable that in the period immediately following the liberation, the fighters of the Communist underground—brave men and extremely well-organized, but glorified unduly by a press taking its orders from Moscow—succeeded in taking over many key positions in France. That was the period in which Communist Ministers took part in the French Government. That time is past. Unobtrusively, effectively, and continuously, action has been taken to remedy the situation. Perhaps the best proof of this lies in the Indo-Chinese war, which France tenaciously continues in spite of the indifference—not to say incomprehension—of her friends. Could that war be fought if Moscow were all-powerful in France?

To deny the Communist threat is as childish as to see it as greater than it is. The facts in France are these:

Around a nucleus of fanatics numbering no more than the six hundred thousand party members are grouped the soured, the discontented, the dreamers, who abound in all countries, and the men of no faith who see that France's defenses are weak and who support the Communists as a way of taking out insurance. There are four million Communist voters in France.

Jules Moch is now France's Defense Minister. While Minister of the Interior, he proved his capacity for taking rigorous police measures against the Communists. One may be sure that he measures the Communist danger for what it is and will not allow it to get out of hand.

The example of the last war shows that clandestine action is effective only against an enemy that is already stricken. The strength of the present fifth column lies mainly in France's weakness and in the fact that it counts on quick support from the Red Army, from which it is separated by no military force worthy of the name.

When the French parliament is again in session, the Communists will surely create new disturbances in another attempt to slow down rearmament. We must anticipate this inevitable reaction to the London proposals—first so that we may put a halt to it; secondly, so that we shall not be surprised when the Communists act, or allow them to slow down our efforts. Moscow will go to any length to prevent the forming of a strong Europe, since such a Europe will no longer allow Russia the free hand it now has in Asia.

The situation is a difficult one and there is cause for anxiety; yet the Korean affair, even though it may increase immediate danger, serves also to draw clear lines for the future.

Now that it has been proven to all Europeans that America has firmly decided to yield nothing more, Europe can guarantee that the three principal obstacles to rearmament—money, manpower, and Fifth Column resistance—will be overcome at all costs as rapidly as possible.

Before us is a period that will remain critical until we have, in fact and not on paper, a minimum of forty divisions with supporting air forces. The more determinedly we act, the faster will we attain this goal. It is not unattainable.

—COLONEL X

Middle West

Harnessing the Missouri

For twenty years, the Missouri basin has been a national problem. In the 1930's, drought, dust storms, and crop failures depleted the valley's resources. Some three hundred thousand people moved away to greener fields. To support those who remained, the Federal government spent \$1.2 billion in relief and emergency aid.

In the 1940's there was plenty of rain—so much, in fact, that destructive floods repeatedly swept down the valley. In one year alone, the value of the topsoil scoured off three states was estimated at \$491 million. After a hundred years of exploitation, the region's resources need replenishment and conservation. That is the goal of an engineering enterprise that is now building more dams, levees, revetments, irriga-

dividends, then possibly the subsidized conservation of them may do likewise.


That such development can provide the seedbed for private capital and generate wider economic opportunity has been demonstrated in the Tennessee Valley. Since the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority, per capita income in that watershed rose from forty per cent of the national average in 1933 to sixty per cent in 1947. More than 2,100 new factories began operation during this period. Employment increased 123 per cent while it was increasing seventy-three per cent in the nation as a whole. Possibly some of these gains would have taken place without TVA, but it is hard to imagine that TVA had nothing to do with them.

The Missouri Valley counts on a comparable improvement. Already there has been substantial new private investment in recreation facilities—a by-product of the new lakes being formed behind the dams. Food processors expect to move in as irrigation in the upper basin shifts crop emphasis from grain and pasture to vegetables and dairying. Cheap power should stimulate the food-freezing industry, as it did in the Tennessee Valley. In the Dakotas it is hoped that cheap power and navigation, coupled with private investment, may unlock deposits of lignite and other marginal minerals. Judging by TVA experience, the basin may also prove attractive to small manufacturing enterprises related to local resources. Nobody expects new Pittsburghs to rise in the basin, but a basic improvement of the region's farm economy will spread throughout its area, from the marketing towns back to the wholesaling cities and the distribution centers.

Within the Missouri watershed lies one-sixth of the nation's area and one-fourth of its cropland. Congress has undertaken to irrigate five million



tion ditches, and power plants than have ever before been used in a single project. Congress has appropriated more than a billion dollars to date, and the final tab will undoubtedly run above ten billion. If this seems costly, it should be remembered what the social subsidies which opened the territory did to create wealth, employment, and private investment. If the subsidized exploitation of resources paid



acres of land, to build two million kilowatts of electric-generating capacity, to hold down the soil against wind and rain, to render a restless, dangerous river system navigable and manageable.

But Congress has yet to face the question of whether these things are being done in the most efficient way. By launching a vast expenditure with only a makeshift plan and no clear lines of responsibility, Congress runs the risk of a gigantic boondoggle.


Some people regard as a boondoggle much of the engineering work so far done along the river. The Army Engineers have been trying, by fits and starts, since 1912, to establish a stable channel for the use of barge shipping. There is a romantic plausibility about river navigation, perhaps because it evokes memories of the days when the river was the valley's only highway. But the brutal truth is that after the dikes and revetments have all been built the volume of barge traffic will probably remain absurdly small.

Nevertheless the Army Engineers have seldom met serious difficulty in obtaining appropriations. They have the backing of Congressmen, Senators, and the most important business interests of the valley cities. A Missouri Valley businessman can breathe fire about "creeping socialism" one day and ask Congress for a subsidized ship channel the next. He dreams of busy barge lines "opening up new markets," providing cheap haulage for raw materials, and, above all, compelling the railroads to reduce their rates.

Drought in the 1930's and floods in the 1940's convinced both the natives and Congress that the valley, in any case, needed more than a navigable channel. A downstream clamor for flood control and an upstream clamor for irrigation set two government agencies to work—as usual, somewhat at cross purposes.

The Army Engineers prepared a blueprint primarily for navigation and flood control. This was the Pick plan, named for Major General Lewis A. Pick, now chief of Army Engineers, the colorful and persuasive technician who built the Ledo Road across Burma.

The Bureau of Reclamation, in the Department of the Interior, drew up its own plan, primarily for power and irrigation. This was the Sloan plan, named for W. G. Sloan, the bureau's field chief in Montana. The bureau had long been projecting an eastward push from arid into semi-arid territory. For those who worried about the stepping up of farm production by one agency, at a time when other agencies were saddled with crop surpluses, the bureau had several answers. It argued that in spite of present distribution problems an expanding economy would soon need more food production. It pointed out that irrigation would stabilize farm production in the valley, channel it into more useful forms,




and make the best use of resources now partly wasted. It said its program would provide a living for fifty-three thousand new farm families, while the accompanying power development would attract new industries, open untapped mineral resources, and help diversify the regional economy.

That the two plans would conflict was inevitable from the outset. Irrigation demands full reservoirs during the hot, dry months; flood control demands empty reservoirs whenever possible. Irrigation demands many tributary reservoirs for the thirsty land of the upper valley; navigation demands big dams on the main stream. These facts, plus the bureaucratic rivalry of two powerful agencies, the competition of the irrigation lobby with the navigation lobby, and the entrenched power of Congressmen devoted to one side or the other, all seemed to make for a classic struggle in American group pressures. The sounds of battle grew louder until the sudden emergence of a third disputant enforced a hasty truce.

The third force was an idea—the idea of a Missouri Valley Authority. Politically weak but logically and emotionally potent, the idea of a regional agency, organized as a public corporation on the model of TVA, offered a ready answer to the feud between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers. If the river had to be parceled out, unitary management of multipurpose reservoirs seemed indispensable. If Pick and Sloan could not agree, why not turn over the show to some Great Plains Lilienthal? The public-corporation form of management would remove control from bickering bureaucrats in Washington and lodge it in a directorate located in the valley itself. TVA's successful struggle to stay out of the toils of Senator McKellar had shown that a regional authority could achieve greater independence from predatory political forces than the established agencies in Washington, and still work directly with the people of the region. So Senator Murray of Montana introduced an MVA bill, and such New Dealers as were left in the age of Truman rallied round.

Enthusiasm was less marked in the region itself. Usually, most of the valley votes Republican. The CIO was



strong for MVA, but weak in the valley. National newspapers like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* came out for MVA, but in the valley only the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and *Star-Times* took up the cause. Jim Patton's small Farmers' Union enlisted for MVA, but the massive Farm Bureau Federation and the powerful irrigators' junta either stood mute or took the other side.

The agitation for MVA had one result. It forced a shotgun marriage between the Pick and Sloan factions. The Army Engineers and the Reclamation Bureau set up an advisory committee representing all the Federal agencies concerned and ten state governments. Dams which had been furiously denounced as engineering monstrosities were now quietly approved. Where one water use conflicted with another, the new Pick-Sloan coalition proposed to build enough facilities for all of them, and decided to trust in God to provide sufficient water.

This may not have been the best engineering, but it was good politics. Congress came through with enough appropriations for work to begin on about forty per cent of the projected installations. In the Dakotas three of the five dams which will convert the Missouri into a series of lakes are under construction, with a hundred others, large and small, to come. The Army Engineers are building flood levees and navigation works on the lower river, and are already talking of extending the head of navigation almost to the mouth of the Yellowstone. The Reclamation Bureau is building tributary dams and irrigation ditches in the upper valley, with a view to doubling the basin's irrigated acreage. In the two fiscal years 1949 and 1950 Congress appropriated \$519 million for the basin. Pick and Sloan want

appropriations of \$2,958,000,000 during the five years 1951 to 1956. Estimated needs after fiscal 1955 are placed at \$5 billion.

To date most of the emphasis has been on big physical structures, but these alone cannot solve all the valley's problems. Floods begin where heavy rains wash topsoil into the upland creeks. Conservationists point out that if this priceless asset is to be saved it must be saved on the uplands. This is where the Department of Agriculture and its Soil Conservation Service come in. Their job is to teach the art of saving soil—a field in which TVA has done some of its most effective work. Yet it appears to be easier to get an appropriation for a dam to hold water than for an anti-erosion project to prevent the reservoir from silting up. So far, the Army Engineers have come away with the biggest share of the Congressional appropriations.

As construction proceeds, the valley is uneasily aware that a better way of managing the project must be found. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers say they have agreed on "over-all policies" for operation of the dams and reservoirs, but it is clear that there will be trouble when the two agencies actually come to the point of deciding whether to release water for irrigation or hold it for navigation. The Hoover Commission bitterly condemned the Pick-Sloan team for having caused "needless delay, confusion, and gross waste of the taxpayers' money." Even the interagency committee shows signs of realizing that some form of unified management will eventually have to be devised. The MVA bill remains locked up in an unfriendly Senate committee, but it casts a long shadow up the valley.

—ROBERT LASCH

What India Is Thinking



Although Indian opinion was at first hesitant, it has by and large followed Prime Minister Nehru's lead since his government gave its support to the United Nations resolution on June 29 to aid South Korea. The fact of North Korean aggression has been recognized by almost all Indian groups except the Communists.

However, there has been a steady insistence on India's basic neutrality, on its friendship with Communist China, and on its refusal to line up with the United States in Formosa and Indo-China. The United States' support of Chiang and Bao Dai remains unpopular; most Indians are unable to see the relevance of such support to the U.N. police action in Korea.

From the beginning, there has been an earnest desire to stay clear of East-West disagreements, which the Indians see simply as rivalry between two power blocs. While Communism is unpopular in India, there is little feeling that it is a force that endangers India as well as other Asian nations, or that it must be halted wherever it reaches out. Indians generally base their support of South Korea on their established opposition to aggression: Since they maintain that Pakistan committed an act of aggression in Kashmir, which India opposed, they now feel obligated to oppose aggression elsewhere. A minority claims that since the United Nations has not condemned the Pakistan aggression in Kashmir, India should not co-operate with the United Nations in Korea.

Nehru's mediation effort was strongly

supported on all sides; the views he expressed represented those of an overwhelming majority. There was some resentment against the Russians for the premature release of the Nehru-Stalin correspondence, but it was quickly exceeded by the widespread resentment against the United States for its answer. Not comprehending the essence of Russian Communism, Indians are convinced that all problems can be resolved if only "an atmosphere of friendliness" can be created in the United Nations, and they are certain that if their suggestions were adopted such an atmosphere would be created.

The reaction of the *Indian News Chronicle*, which heretofore has been friendly, is fairly typical of press reaction to the Acheson note: "Acheson's message to the Prime Minister not only dashes all hope of an early peace to the ground, but also makes extension and intensification of the conflict inevitable. The American note is sore with a sense of loneliness and breathes a frantic faith in the omnipotence of force—till now associated only with totalitarian régimes. . . . The rebuff administered to Nehru is not a rebuff to an officious peacemonger, but an affront to the spirit of world peace."

Only now are Indians gradually beginning to understand the U.S. position: that seating Communist China in the United Nations before settlement of the Korean issue would constitute appeasement. This understanding, however, does not constitute approval, and in the main, Indians remain convinced that once Communist China is seated, all difficulties can be ironed out. This difference in opinion with the United States seems irreconcilable.

The shift in public opinion against the United States has not pushed India into the Communist camp, however. The American reverses in Korea are regretted and explained in most news-

papers; almost all the news is supplied by Anglo-American agencies or correspondents. Tass dispatches are little quoted except by a few Communist or left-wing papers, which of course have been having a field day at American expense.

The Congress Party stands behind Nehru in his support of the U.N. Korean actions and his efforts to mediate and retain India's neutrality. The Socialists also back Nehru, but the right-wing extremist organization—the Hindu Mahasabha—virtually follows the Communist line in its violent demands that India stay clear of western entanglements. Deputy Prime Minister Patel is said to advocate closer co-



operation with the West and abandonment of India's neutral position, but is believed to have deferred to Nehru on the neutrality issue. The Cabinet in general follows Nehru on foreign policy.


The parliamentary debate on the Korean issue was led off by President Prasad's strong condemnation of North Korean aggression. Nehru's speech calling for support of South Korea but simultaneously criticizing the West for its "lack of all subtlety and lack of any approach to the mind and heart of Asia" and reiterating the necessity for Communist China's seating in the United Nations, was well received and probably summed up the general Indian attitude as completely as any other statement that has been made on the issue.

Public opinion, in so far as it exists, takes its cue from government statements and from the newspapers. In general it seems confused and undecided on how far India should commit itself. A deep suspicion of the West still exists among most literate Indians, and Russia—to them—is still an unknown force.

The press also is confused. In general, it seems to feel that India was right in opposing the North Korean aggression; that Communist China deserves a seat on the Security Council and that the United States has largely created the present difficulties by opposing this seating; that the United States was wrong in wanting to defend Formosa or aid Bao Dai; that India must stay out of any third world war; that Stalin's reply to Nehru was encouraging and shows that Russia wants peace; and that America will sacrifice the respect of Asia if it drops the atomic bomb on Korea.

The *Hindustan Standard* of Calcutta voiced typical suspicion of the United Nations and fear of Asian involvement: "The Security Council's latest decision on Korea and the Kremlin's violent denunciation of it have robbed the United Nations of its feeble authority and effectiveness. Asian nations are faced with a hard test. Involvement in the war on either side will be not only against our national interest but also disastrous to the cause of freedom and peace in Southeast Asia."

The Chinese issue is a persistently



thorny one. On this the *Indian News Chronicle* for August 3 voiced what is probably the basic Indian opinion: "Faced by the fait accompli of the Communist régime on the Chinese mainland, Washington delayed her recognition of Peking. Now her insistence on keeping Communist China out of the Security Council has the perversity of one who, faced with inconvenient facts, stubbornly refuses to recognize them. In doing so, Washington overlooks one important fact. It is the Chinese, not the American people, who have the right to say whom they recognize as their government. And they have said so in no uncertain voice."

"For Washington to prop up the discredited régime of Chiang Kai-shek as a government entitled to respect and support is to forfeit Asian confidence in . . . her policy Whatever the Indian government may be accused of, it cannot be accused of undue regard for Communist doctrine. Nor is opinion in this country in favor of the Gospel as preached by Moscow. . . . India would not like either herself or Asia to be drilled into Red subservience, but no more would she like areas inside Asia to be dragged into Democracy. That is the crux of the matter and the reason why some manifestations of United States policy have provoked sharp hostility in this country. It is not the least depressing irony of this deplorable situation that the combined policies of America and Britain—by

their blind refusal to face facts—are assisting Marxist battle cries of 'Hands off Korea.' It is not too late to retrieve the situation, but the sands are running out."

The best analysis of Indian feelings about Russia and the democracies was probably made by *The Statesman* of Calcutta, which is British-owned but impartial and influential:

"There is in the country at large an understandable suspicion of great power maneuvers: also, though out of date and mostly based on habit and inaccurate information, a distrust of European and American diplomacy as such. Despite British abdication of power in India, it is sometimes assumed that colonialism has made merely a temporary retreat. The plain issue of Communist aggression is ignored; old, unhappy, far-off things continue to sway opinion, and battles long ago retain lively consequences in the year 1950."

It must be recognized that in India it is "imperialism," not "Communism," that is the hated word. "Russian imperialism" is a meaningless phrase to most Indians, for they know little about it and believe that much of what they hear is western propaganda. But western imperialism is an old story, and one which Indians suspect America is about to retell. Indian liberals like Nehru (and theirs is now the voice of India), seeing the United States support reactionary régimes around the world, cannot feel enthusiastic at the prospect of saying "ditto" to Anglo-American policy, and thus, by implication, supporting such men as Chiang, Bao Dai, and, most recently, Franco. Nor, unlike western liberals, have they yet become disillusioned about the possibility of co-operation with the Soviet Union, although they favor taking vigorous measures against the Indian Communist Party.

When the chips are finally down, wise counsel will no doubt prevail, and India, because it is basically democratic, will side with the democracies. But no one in India will like being forced into this position, nor, it appears to me, will India's co-operation with the West be without reservation, for the psychological scars from the past are still too deep and too fresh.

—MARGARET PARTON

Milwaukee: A Good Paper Pays Off

The Milwaukee *Journal* has a daily and Sunday circulation of just under four hundred thousand in a city of just under seven hundred thousand population. Although it is not and never has been the only newspaper in Milwaukee, it goes regularly into nine of every ten Milwaukee homes, into half the urban homes in Wisconsin, and into more Wisconsin and Upper Michigan farm homes than all other newspapers put together.

More copies of the Milwaukee *Journal* are sold in New York City than copies of the *New York Times* in all Wisconsin.

The *Journal* led all the newspapers in the United States in advertising lineage in 1944 and 1945, and bids fair to repeat in 1950.

As far back as 1919 it won a Pulitzer Prize for conspicuous service, being the second newspaper so honored.

The *Journal* uses more color printing than any newspaper in the world.

The Milwaukee *Journal* is the only metropolitan daily in the United States really owned by its staff.

Obviously, the *Journal* is a successful newspaper. It happens also to be a good newspaper.

How can one be sure whether or not any given newspaper is a good one? No one seems to have come up with a sounder method for judging than the following: First, make an estimate of what those in the readership area require, in terms of community, county, state, regional, national and world information and guidance, in order to be able to discharge their citizen-functions knowledgeably; second, examine samples of the paper covering at least a ten-year period, and not fewer than ninety consecutive current issues, with a view to calculating the extent to which it meets these requirements (bearing in mind that no newspaper


publisher can, in good conscience, pass the buck to other newspapers, news magazines, magazines of opinion, radio broadcasters, or movie makers); third, check the results with the people at the shirt-sleeve levels who make the paper; fourth, check them with shirt-sleeve employees of other papers.

Using this technique, one must come to the conclusion that the Milwaukee *Journal* is a remarkably good newspaper, on a number of major counts.

First, it has unfalteringly maintained what might be called a global or historic outlook, in a community and a state that have not always been celebrated for that sort of thing.

To get the full force of this statement, one has to go back to 1915. The First World War was a year old. Germany appeared to be winning. A majority of the more than half of Milwaukee's population that were of German stock were hoping, secretly or openly, that Germany would win. These people had their own foreign-language newspaper, and they revolved about the most powerful political-social axis in the county: the Germania Club. The strongest political faction in Milwaukee was the Social Democratic Party, whose founders, Eugene V. Debs

and Victor L. Berger, also had their own papers, and had dedicated them to keeping America out of the war. The biggest figure in the state was Old Bob LaFollette, equally opposed to U.S. intervention, and likewise the possessor of a powerful personal press. In addition to these, the *Journal* had two lively competitors in Milwaukee. Unlike LaFollette, Debs, Berger, and the Germania Club, the *Journal* was not at



the height of its power. It made money, but the black ink was so thin that one mistake could have ruined the paper, then in its thirty-third year. Lucius Nieman, its founder, had decided that the best interests of America called for speedy intervention on the side of the Allies. He hired a special staff which translated five million "treasonable" words from the German-language press, and denounced the "traitors" out of their own mouths.

This was the campaign that won for the *Journal* a Pulitzer citation. But it merely set a pattern. A generation later, when Nieman was dead and the *Journal*, under Harry J. Grant (still chairman of the board), was just beginning its experiment in employee ownership, the paper sailed into the strongest German-American Bund unit in America, and ultimately broke it, months before New York and New Jersey addressed themselves to similar problems.

The Milwaukee *Journal* was one of the first newspapers in the country to see the Nazi-Fascist menace for what it was, and to call for preparedness to meet it; to demand whole-hearted support for the United Nations, as it had campaigned relentlessly for U.S. adherence to the League of Nations and the World Court; to hail the principle behind the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. At the moment the *Journal* is supporting the stiffened attitude toward Russian aggression, while at the same time sharply criticizing the delay in arriving at it, the lack of a military posture consonant with it, and certain aspects of the steps now being taken to implement it.

The second reason why one would judge the *Journal* to be a good paper is that, unlike some papers with vigorous global outlooks, it does not neglect local problems.

The most topical instance of this concerns Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. To most of us, McCarthy has become a national, one might even say an international, issue; to the *Journal* he is also a local issue. The *Journal* has devoted more space to taking the Senator apart than any other paper in the world. It was the *Journal* that led the pack to McCarthy's income-tax records in Madison. The intimate "I knew him when" pieces done by numerous *Journal* staffers who did know the Senator have proved far more



Lucius W. Nieman founded a tradition that . . .

devastating (at least in Wisconsin, where McCarthy's political future rests) than all the invective and vituperation of more remote editorial writers playing by ear.

In its sixty-eight years the *Journal* has taken on all comers, big and small: Old Bob LaFollette, Vic Berger, and the Germania Club for sabotaging Wilson; Phil LaFollette for salving personal frustration with dreams of becoming a native *führer*, and Young Bob LaFollette for spending too little time in Wisconsin; local industrialists for sending thugs to meet union organizers, and union leaders for crowding their luck with wildcat strikes; city officials for taking too many holidays, and citizens for unfairly criticizing an exceptionally able group of city officials; landlords for not painting more often, and tenants for not putting flower boxes in the windows; big boys who beat their wives, and small boys who beat their pets; anybody who thinks he can beat the Golden Rule.

In 1883, when the paper was only a few months old, it blamed the owners, public officials, and a "lazy and indifferent" public for a hotel fire that took nearly a hundred lives. Powerful interests denounced the campaign as "bad for business," but the *Journal* kept shouting until it had effected a revolution in public safety. The *Journal* is largely responsible for Milwaukee's magnificent park system, for the restoration of Wisconsin's once-denuded forests and decimated wild life, and for making model state welfare institutions out of ones which had been among the worst in the country. In the 1930's the

paper began a vigorous drive to clean up the blighted downtown areas, with results which shame nearly every other urban center facing the same problem.

The *Journal* has done its bit to win for Milwaukee a lion's share of national laurels for health, traffic safety, low crime rates, and fire prevention. And no citizen is under any illusion about the *Journal's* letting the town rest on the laurels it has already won.

The *Journal* has never been a respecter of persons. Years ago (before they learned better) advertisers used to threaten to pull out unless this or that was done or not done; they never had their way. On the other hand, when recently a friendless Chinese laundryman was on trial for manslaughter in connection with the killing of a savage brat who had been tormenting him for years, the *Journal* supplemented its routine coverage by sending its drama-and-music critic down to the courtroom to write one of the most magnificent social documents ever printed in a daily newspaper.

The *Journal* practices what others preach. It seldom runs an editorial urging generous citizen support for a venture requiring funds without first having sent along its own check. For a time the paper was involved in the municipal art museum virtually to the point of being its sole benefactor. This spring, while the press generally, surveying the latest crop of college graduates, deplored the lack of opportunities for Negroes, the *Journal* hired Bob Teague, the University of Wisconsin's great colored back—not to be a show-



Harry J. Grant carries on

case freak, but as a go-anywhere, cover-anything sports writer.

The *Journal* is well edited. By this I do not mean simply that care is taken to write symmetrical headlines and present everything in geometric patterns pleasing to the eye.

Editing begins with careful staffing, the efficient assigning of staffers to their various tasks, and the planned purchase of wire-service and syndicate material to supplement staff coverage. In one way and another, the *Journal* screens and uses material from nearly everything printed that's worth using. Virtually every member of the staff does some relevant supplementary reading of books and periodicals.

The *Journal* hires no one for spurious reasons of prestige, and it buys nothing for the privilege of throwing it away. In peacetime it maintains its own bureaus in Washington and New York, as well as in Madison (the state capital) and other principal Wisconsin cities. It usually has a roving correspondent somewhere on the planet digging up things of particular interest to Milwaukeeans. In time of war it sends one or two men to the fronts. But their instructions are to concentrate on matters of local interest, leaving the news of wide general interest, as well as the Olympian punditry, to wire-service veterans who have demonstrated in some instances that they are better at it than most by-line specialists.

In sum, the Milwaukee *Journal* keeps a good young staff, buys full AP and UP world coverage, and brings books and magazines and exchange

papers into the shop by the truckload. It squeezes all these sources dry, selects the best with some idea of the essential continuity and interrelation of news, and prints it fully.

Perhaps most important of all, the *Journal* has always managed to preserve an air of judicial detachment, to avoid the partisan approach to issues and men. In a state and city celebrated for explosive personalities, one-man parties, frequent eruptions of violent economic and ethnic groups, and some pretty shrill journalism, the paper has stood aside, like a veritable high court, despising no man and worshiping none, wearing no party's colors for even a day, its collective mind always open to the new and untried, yet slow to discard the cumulative wisdom of human experience, steeped in both the common and the moral law, and rendering always in good season a verdict based upon law, in stubborn disregard of popular moods and the fear of reprisal. Thus its signature is on no embarrassing mortgage, no promissory note; and so, not even during that one autumn in four when Presidents are elected does it have to do a circus bare-back split, one foot on a Dewey or Bowles, the other on a Taft or Byrd.

Another reason why the *Journal* is a good newspaper is that it is financially successful. Solvency does appear to be an indispensable condition to independence, whether from the wicked advertisers or from some nice rich widow with a yen for Henry Wallace.

These criteria may leave something to be desired. They are the criteria by which I suppose some men judge the

New York *Times* to have been the best all-around paper in the world throughout the first half of this century. The *Journal* is not a crusading paper, any more than the *Times* is a crusading paper. On the contrary, the *Journal* is a conservative paper, in the same pure meaning of the word that characterizes the *Times*: "one who conserves." From time to time the *Journal* seems frustratingly slow to make up its mind, painstakingly judicial in its judgments, meticulously fair to scoundrels; precisely as the *Times* sometimes boils the blood of emotional New Yorkers eager to get on with the job of saving the world. Yet if there is any consistency to this business of "grading" newspapers, it is difficult to see how anyone who would put the *Times* on the list could keep the *Journal* off.

What brings together the men and the conditions that make for such a record?

Coincidence, some would say: You take a pretty good community in a pretty good state, let some pretty good guy come in there and buy or start a paper, let the good guy hire some other good guys, and you'll get off to a running start, sew up the advertisers, squeeze out the competition, and then you can run on the momentum.

One can dismiss the momentum myth at once. It is true that all that remains of the once brisk competition is the *Sentinel*, a Hearst morning paper; but the *Sentinel* still offers some brisk competition, particularly on local news. The *Journal* has to be better—365 days a year—to stay on top.

It appears to be true that no paper can be very much better than the community it serves. In the instance of the New York *Times*, what is required for the success of a serious, literate paper is only a congenial fraction of a community large enough to support several newspapers catering to widely different tastes. In a city the size of Milwaukee, pretty much the entire community has to be congenial. (I may wind up by ranking the *Journal* ahead of the *Times*, for in declining to sink to any common denominator the *Journal* has resolutely turned its back on a temptation the *Times* has never had to face.)

Fortunately for the *Journal*, Milwaukee is a rather special community. The earliest permanent settlers were Anglo-Saxon Americans from New

England, New York, and Pennsylvania. The next big influx was of German forty-eighters. Then came the Norwegians and Swedes; and in the 1880's the last big batch from Germany, mostly Social Democrats. Many others have come since, including Poles and Italians, and, most recently, Southern Negroes. Most of these groups seem to have absorbed something of the love of beauty, the leisurely tempo, the profound respect for law and for the rights of individuals, the thriftiness, the essential decency that has always predominated.

Milwaukee has a suburban rather than a metropolitan look. Few downtown buildings run over ten stories, and fewer still are of the cigar-box or wedding-cake architecture of modern skyscrapers. The city boasts acres of spic-and-span parks, a landscaped lakefront fringed with mansions, and row on row of neat German cottages flanked by flowers. There is little night life, because Milwaukeeans cannot seem to shake the notion that home is the best place in which to dine. Afterward, airings in the family car, bridge, occasionally still *schafskopf* and *skat*, even conversation, suffice for amusement, if there doesn't happen to be a symphony concert. Now, of course, there is television; and the *Journal* offers the best in that, just as for years it has offered the best in radio.

Wisconsin is a rather special state. It contains the same ethnic and political elements as Milwaukee. Its constitution was drafted by Jacksonian Democrats, who wrote into it the strongest possible safeguards against banks and mortgage foreclosures, a statutory limit on state debt, and the firm concept that public improvements should be financed by private capital.

Despite this Democratic legacy, there have been but three Democratic governors since 1856. The G.O.P. was cradled in Wisconsin, run for twenty-five years by a succession of undistinguished Civil War veterans, controlled for another twenty by the railroads, and then (in 1900) taken over by Old Bob LaFollette. With the aid of Milwaukee Social Democrats, LaFollette established direct primaries and introduced a fourth dimension in democratic government: the bi-partisan regulatory bureau, on which the ICC, the FTC, the FCC and other Federal agencies were patterned. Old Bob ruled

for more than a quarter of a century, but had to step aside as top G.O.P. dog in Wisconsin temporarily (in 1915) for a Republican Stalwart, because he could not see, as Lute Nieman of the *Journal* could, that the Kaiser was as much a threat to Wisconsin as Wall Street was.

The measure of Wisconsin is that when its farmers discovered that Minnesota could raise more and cheaper



wheat, they quietly shifted to dairying; that for most of its recent history it has been governed by a mélange of Social Democrats, Bull Moosers, conservative Republicans, and unlabeled citizen leaders; that it has survived Gene Debs, Vic Berger, Phil LaFollette and Alexander Wiley, and will survive Joe McCarthy. It is the *Journal's* claim that it was never identified with, or unfair to, any of them. All through the years, it has hung there on the wall that is Wisconsin's conscience, like a family motto above the Dresden figurines.

So you do have the coincidence of a good community in a good state. But even with the indispensable coincidence of just the right sort of artesian well water and hop-growing conditions, it took some rather remarkable brewmasters to make household words of Schlitz, Pabst, Blatz, and Miller's High Life. The *Journal*, too, needed its expert brewmasters. It has had two: Lucius W. Nieman, who founded the paper in 1882 and died in 1935; and Harry J. Grant, who came in 1916 as business manager and still carries on as the vigorous chairman of the board.

Lute Nieman set the judicial tone of the paper, established its editorial independence and courage, and gave it its constant preoccupation with world affairs. Like others with the same *idée fixe*, he never quite recovered from Wilson's rout, the repudiation of their common dream, and the dissipation of victory's fruits. In time he became something of a professional martyr to an ideal that neither his community nor the nation was yet prepared to share, more and more leaving the day-to-day details of covering the universe of Warren Gamaliel Harding to Henry Campbell, his trusty, crusty, Scots managing editor, who believed in small staffs, small wages, and eighteen-hour days.

The paper's founder had never known anything about its business end. Grant knew a great deal, and lost no time putting it to use. Within three years of his arrival earnings had doubled. But advertisers were beginning to complain that the paper was old-fashioned. Nieman tartly rejoined, with the righteous indignation of a boardinghouse keeper defending dull fare with a gratuitous reminder of her unquestioned good name, that the *Journal* enjoyed a unique reputation. He could not for the life of him see that better pay would attract better cooks to make better cake out of precisely the same ingredients.

Grant casually appropriated the title of publisher, and, armed with this recognized prize of journalistic protocol, lured Marvin H. Creager away from the Kansas City *Star* to be managing editor. Creager's creed was that "one human, earthy story about something done by or happening to someone in our own city is worth a dozen from the press-association wires." One by one, Grant and Creager hired able newsmen who believed that. City folk and farmers began to find on their spacious front porches and in their R.F.D. boxes not just a good newspaper but a good Milwaukee and Wisconsin newspaper.

And then, in the grim winter of 1935-1936, a specter appeared in the bank-like lobby of the handsome new Journal Building at Fourth and State. A good newspaper, just on the threshold of greatness, almost passed into the hands of a man whose only touchstone was money.

—LLEWELLYN WHITE
(This is the first of two articles.)



The Yak-9, mounting a 20-mm cannon in the propeller hub and two machine guns in the cowlings

Parachutes of 'peace': Russian troopers ready for a practice drop

